FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Daily Report

East Europe

ATTENTION!! ATTENTION!! ATTENTION!!

FBIS will phase out publication of most of its paper reports, including ALL Daily Reports and most FBIS Reports, by 31 December 1996.

See inside for information on how to access FBIS products and services electronically.

FBIS-EEU-96-130
Friday
5 July 1996

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Dear Customer:

Responding to our many customers' requests, NTIS is offering FBIS publications electronically. Due to resource limitations, hardcopy production of FBIS publications will be phased out during 1996. Hardcopy reports will be discontinued according to the following schedule:

1 April	*Arms Control and Proliferation Issues*
1 May	*Environment and World Health*
1 June	*Narcotics*
1 July	*Terrorism*

Hardcopy publication of the regional DAILY REPORTS will cease as follows:

1 August	*China, Latin America*
19 August	*Near East and South Asia, West Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, West Europe Economic Review*
2 September	*East Asia, East Europe, East Europe Economic Review*
16 September	*Central Eurasia, Central Eurasia Military Affairs, Central Eurasia Economic Review*

FBIS' goal is to cease publication of all hardcopy reports by 31 December 1996 except for S&T PERSPECTIVES, S&T CENTRAL EURASIA, S&T CHINA, S&T KOREA, S&T EUROPE, and S&T JAPAN. The S&T reports will continue to be published as hardcopy until the graphics they contain can be disseminated on-line.

FBIS products are offered electronically through the National Technical Information Service's (NTIS) "World News Connection" (WNC). This is a new on-line subscription service accessible through the World Wide Web. The Web address is http://wnc.fedworld.gov. Please see the next page for a subscription form or call NTIS Fax Direct at 703-487-4140 and enter product code 8645 to receive more information.

World News Connection™

A Foreign News Alert Service from the U.S. Government

World News Connection - WNC1.....**$ 21**
7 Day - Introductory Offer
Unlimited interactive searching
[no profiles]
Order number SUB-9856BDQ

World News Connection - WNC2.....**$ 50**
Monthly
Unlimited interactive searching
[no profiles]
Order number PB95-985700BDQ

World News Connection - WNC3.....**$ 75**
Monthly
Unlimited interactive searching
[1 profile]
Order number PB95-985800BDQ

World News Connection - WNC4.....**$100**
Monthly
Unlimited interactive searching
[up to 5 profiles]
Order number PB95-985900BDQ
(Prices are subject to change)

User Name *(Please Print or Type)*	**Internet E-mail Address** *(Required)*	**Order Number**	**Price**
1) _____	_____	_____	_____
2) _____	_____	_____	_____

(Continue on a blank sheet if more space is required)

Deposit Account Number (for NTIS account customers only): _____

Customer Master Number (if known): _____ **Date:** _____

Contact Name: _____ **Organization:** _____

Street Address: _____ **City:** _____ **State:** _____ **Zip:** _____

Province/Territory: _____ **Country:** _____

Foreign Postal Code: _____

Internet E-mail Address (Organization contact person): _____

Telephone Number: ( ) _____ **Fax Number:** ( ) _____

Credit Card Number: _____

Credit Card Expiration Date: _____

Card Type (Visa, Master Card, or American Express): _____

Cardholder's Name (as printed on the credit card): _____

Cardholder's Signature (required to validate all orders): _____

(Please fax this form back to NTIS at 703-321-8547. Fax service is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
To verify receipt of your fax, call (703) 487-4679 between 7:00am - 5:00pm, Monday - Friday, Eastern Time.)

Daily Report
East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-130 *5 July 1996*

CONTENTS

NOTICE: This volume contains a representative selection of material previously disseminated in softcopy format.

ALBANIA

Albania: 'Thin Gruel' of Macedonian Policy Criticized *[REPUBLIKA 2 Jul]* 1
Albania: Article Sees 'Cooling' in Relations With U.S. *[KOHA JONE 3 Jul]* 1
Albania: Berisha Welcomes Yeltsin's 'Deserved' Victory *[Tirana TV]* 3
Albania: Chief of Army Staff, Italian Admiral Meet *[ATA]* 3
Albania: Dailies Call For PS 'Reformation' *[ATA]* 3
Albania: PD Leader Denies PS Asked for Dialogue *[ATA]* 3
Albania: PS Official Reportedly Fled With Party Funds *[ATA]* 4
Albania: PS Presidium Asks Nano To Withdraw Motion *[GAZETA SHQIPTARE 4 Jul]* 4

BULGARIA

Bulgaria: MP's Ask Greek Minister About Pomak Issue *[DUMA 3 Jul]* 6
Bulgaria: Russian Interior Ministry Official Accredited to Sofia *[DUMA 5 Jul]* 6
Bulgaria: Pavlov To Demand Increase in Army Budget *[TRUD 5 Jul]* 6

CZECH REPUBLIC

Czech Republic: Replacement of IFOR Battalion Begins 4 Jul *[PRAVO 4 Jul]* 7
Czech Republic: Postelection Situation 'Complicates' NATO Entry *[LIDOVE NOVINY 2 Jul]* 7
Czech Republic: Prime Minister Assesses Army's Main Tasks *[Prague Radio]* 8
Czech Republic: Zeman Views New Role, Coalition Cooperation *[PRAVO 29 Jun]* 8

SLOVAKIA

Slovakia: Kovac Sends Congratulations to Yeltsin *[Bratislava TV]* 11
Slovakia: Barnier-Hoyer Talks With Authorities 'Tense' *[Paris LE FIGARO 3 Jul]* 11
Slovakia: Doctors Advise Meciar To Convalesce Longer *[SME 3 Jul]* 11

HUNGARY

Hungary: Kovacs on Yeltsin Victory, Russian Foreign Policy *[Budapest TV]* 12
Hungary: Security Cabinet Agrees To Fight Economic Crime *[NEPSZABADSAG 3 Jul]* 12
Hungary: Editorial Views Freedom of Investigative Journalism *[NEPSZAVA 1 Jul]* 12

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

B-H: Daily Notes Lack of Agreement on Defense Law *[OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) 5 Jul]* 14
B-H: Future Military Financing, Structure Discussed *[Sarajevo Radio]* 14
B-H: Suitability of Weapons Provided by U.S. Questioned *[VECERNJI LIST 15 Jun]* 14
B-H: Serbs Order Finnish Forensic Team To Stop Work *[AFP]* 16
B-H: Croat Mayor Discusses Results of Mostar Election *[VECERNJI LIST 3 Jul]* 16
B-H: Official Views Having To Repeat Mostar Elections *[Sarajevo TV]* 18
B-H: EU Postpones Announcement of Mostar Election Results *[AFP]* 18
B-H: Daily on Implications of Mostar Elections for Bosnia *[OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) 3 Jul]* 19
B-H: Significance of Mostar Elections Highlighted *[VJESNIK 2 Jul]* 19
B-H: Markovic Justifies Herzeg-Bosnia Government *[HRVATSKI OBZOR 1 Jul]* 20

B-H: Recent 'Fierce' Bosniak-Croatian Border Clashes *[Bad Vilbel VESTI 5 Jul]* 22
B-H: Parties React to OSCE Election Rules *[OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) 25, 26, 29 Apr]* 23
B-H: Plavsic Comments on Her Talks With Milosevic *[SRNA]* 23
B-H: Karadzic Attempts To Take Over Bijeljina Media *[BETA]* 24
B-H: Klickovic Describes Karadzic as 'Soul of the Serb Nation' *[SRNA]* 24
B-H: Djindjic Praises Karadzic Withdrawal From Election *[SRNA]* 24
B-H: Karadzic's 'Forced' Withdrawal From Elections Viewed *[Pale TV]* 25
B-H: Montenegrin 'Source' Claims Mladic 'Seriously Ill' *[NASA BORBA 5 Jul]* 25

CROATIA

Croatia: 'Sources' Claim Croatian Army To Storm Vukovar *[DNEVNI TELEGRAF 3 Jul]* 26
Croatia: Serb Association Claims 600 Serbs in Mass Graves *[BETA 3 Jul]* 26
Croatia: UNTAES Says Croatian Amnesty Law Inadequate *[SRNA 3 Jul]* 26
Croatia: Serb Official Criticizes Exclusions From Amnesty Law *[Beli Manastir Radio]* 27
Croatia: Serb Secretariat Protests Croat Indictment of Policemen *[Beli Manastir TV]* 27
Croatia: Hadzic, Arkan Comment on List of 811 War Criminals *[Beli Manastir Radio]* 28
Croatia: Serbs Protest Exclusion From Regional Talks *[Beli Manastir Radio]* 29
Croatia: Serb Radio Criticizes Exceptions to Amnesty Law *[Beli Manastir Radio]* 29
Croatia: Financial Aid Linked to Reintegration of Serb Areas *[TANJUG]* 30

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

FYROM: Albanians Demonstrate for Tetovo University *[TANJUG]* 31
FYROM: Almost 40,000 Albanians Attend Rally in Tetovo *[Tirana TV]* 31
FYROM: Article Reflects on Impact of Kosovo Partition *[DNEVNIK 29 Jun]* 32

POLAND

Poland: President on 'Favorable' Election Outcome in Russia *[Warsaw Radio]* 35
Poland: Politicians React to Predictions of Yeltsin Victory *[ZYCIE WARSZAWY 4 Jul]* 35
Poland: Warsaw Press Reaction to Russian Elections *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 4 Jul, etc.]* 35
Poland: Austria's Vranitzky Holds Talks on NATO, EU *[Vienna ORF Teletext]* 36
Poland: Albright Seeks Support in Replacing UN Head *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 4 Jul]* 37
Poland: Goals of President's Visit to U.S. Defined *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 4 Jul]* 37
Poland: More on Kwasniewski's Visit to U.S. *[TRYBUNA 5 Jul]* 37
Poland: Defense Minister To Visit PRC, Discuss Accords *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 3 Jul]* 38
Poland: Kwasniewski Views Domestic Political Scene *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 1 Jul]* 38
Poland: Pentagon Offer To Purchase Tanks for Bosnia Declined *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 3 Jul]* 41
Poland: SLD Official Rejects 'Astounding Opinions' on Concordat *[PAP]* 42

ROMANIA

Romania: Anti-Iliescu Slogan Heard During Mrs. Clinton Visit *[EVENIMENTUL ZILEI 2 Jul]* 43
Romania: Iliescu Justifies Meeting With PDSR Leadership *[Bucharest Radio]* 43
Romania: Constantinescu Confident of Election Victory *[ROMANIA LIBERA 27 Jun]* 43
Romania: Iron Guard Considers Running in Nov Elections *[JURNALUL NATIONAL 2 Jul]* 44
Romania: Price Hikes Discussed With Employers, Unions *[Bucharest Radio]* 44

SLOVENIA

Slovenia: Drnovsek Comments on Meeting With Perry, NATO *[Ljubljana Radio]* 46
Slovenia: Kucan, Austria's Klestil Discuss EU, Schengen *[Ljubljana Radio]* 46

YUGOSLAVIA

Serbia

Serbia: Milosevic Receives Carl Bildt in Belgrade *[TANJUG]* 47

Serbia: Milosevic Receives UN Administrator for Slavonia *[TANJUG]* 47
Serbia: Plavsic Assures Milosevic of Commitment to Dayton *[TANJUG]* 47
Serbia: GSS's Pesic Says Karadzic Still RS Leader *[BETA]* 47
Serbia: Serbian Opposition Leader on Karadzic's Withdrawal *[SRNA]* 48
Serbia: Karadzic's 'Willingness To Make Sacrifices' Noted *[SRNA]* 48
Serbia: RS Socialists See Karadzic as 'Politically Dead' *[NASA BORBA 2 Jul]* 48
Serbia: Karadzic Seen Leaving 'Backwards, Like a Crab' *[NASA BORBA 2 Jul]* 48
Serbia: Editorial Describes Karadzic 'Clutching at Straws' *[VECERNJE NOVOSTI 3 Jul]* 49
Serbia: SPS's Gajevis: 'Less Political' Hague Tribunal *[BORBA 1 Jul]* 50
Serbia: Reshuffling of Government Viewed *[NIN 31 May]* 50
Serbia: Media Handling of Djindjic Case Protested *[BETA]* 53

Montenegro

Montenegro: Djindjic: Republic Opposes 'Dictator' Milosevic *[BETA]* 53

Vojvodina

Vojvodina: Editorial Criticizes Federal Government *[MAGYAR SZO 13 Apr]* 53

Albania: 'Thin Gruel' of Macedonian Policy Criticized

AU0307125396 Tirana REPUBLIKA in Albanian 2 Jul 96 p 3

[Commentary by Gavrosh Levonja: "The Still Problematic Status of the Albanians in Macedonia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Macedonia has been accused by Human Rights Watch-Helsinki of violating the rights of the Albanians. Even when Macedonian legislation matches modern standards in the protection of these rights, they remain a dead letter. The main problem is the attitude of the authorities in this small republic against national minorities. The Albanian nation, which according to official statistics makes up one-fourth of the population of Macedonia, is doubtless the main victim. The Albanians of Macedonia are left outside the state administration and the police force, not to mention the absurd restrictions on their education. When the list of judges in Macedonia was recently published, including more than 500 names, only 32 were Albanian. A few days ago the Macedonian judiciary upheld the sentence of imprisonment against Fadil Sulejmani, the rector of Tetovo University, and two of his colleagues. Some time ago, the Macedonian authorities deported the correspondents of the newspaper RILINDJA from their territory, handing them over to officials of the Serbian Interior Ministry, while journalists coming from Albania to report on various events have also been mistreated; their normal work has been obstructed, and they have been taken to police stations.

However, the comments by Human Rights Watch-Helsinki should bring a blush to the cheeks of those in charge of the Albanian state. It is an undeniable fact that during the last few years, since Macedonia was created, the Albanian state has done nothing to improve the status of the Albanians in Macedonia. Naively and incomprehensibly, in its efforts to preserve the stability of Macedonia, the policy of Albania has not even considered making this stability that Macedonia needs so much conditional on the status of the Albanians who live there. It is true that Albania has needed Macedonia in order to make the "East-West corridor" operational, but, at least until recently, Macedonia has had more need for Albania. It was inexplicable and ridiculous to put the port of Durres unconditionally at the disposal of Macedonia when Greece imposed an 18-month blockade. What is worse is that it was precisely at this time that Albania, instead of turning the Greek-Macedonian quarrels to its own purpose by asking Skopje for improvements to the status of the Albanians, froze its relations with Greece.

Now it must unfortunately be admitted that the position of Macedonia in the region is stronger, while that of Albania has been weakened. It is also striking to an observer that while the official policy of Tirana has always been to raise its voice over the problem of the Albanians in Kosova, the Albanians in Macedonia have been sunk in oblivion, even though the chances of reaching success in their case have been greater. Macedonia, whose relations with Belgrade and the other republics of the former Yugoslavia have now been normalized, has taken notable steps forward in normalizing its relations with Greece, not to mention Europe and other countries. Only two days ago, Gligorov was a guest of Turkish President Demirel. However, the stabilization of Macedonia, the end of the war in the former Yugoslavia, and especially the lifting of the embargo against Serbia and Montenegro have led to Albania losing importance for Europe and the United States. The appointment as ambassador to Skopje of Christopher Hill, a high-caliber diplomat and expert in Balkan problems, testifies clearly to the importance the United States attaches to Macedonia. Mr. Perry's recent visit to eastern Europe, in which he forgot Tirana but not Skopje, is also a sign reinforcing this impression. Under such circumstances it would be very difficult for the Albanian Government to achieve any success in raising the problems of the rights of the Albanian in Macedonia. In this sense, Albania policy is paying and will continue to pay the price of feeding itself on the thin gruel of being a so-called factor of stability in the region. Now, when many pieces in the political jigsaw of the region have more or less fallen into place, the Albanian state will see what real importance and value the international community attaches to Albania.

Albania: Article Sees 'Cooling' in Relations With U.S.

AU0407125996 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 3 Jul 96 p 5

[Article by Blendi Fevziu: "Who Fights for and Against Berisha in Washington"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The relations of the Democratic Party [PD] with the United States are not what they were. This comment has been made in the press several times in the wake of the declarations of the State Department's spokesman about the elections in Albania, but the fact became especially evident three days ago following a harsh attack in TRIBUNA DEMOKRATIKE against Carl Siebentricht, the U.S. diplomat in Tirana. The harsh language of the statement by the newspaper's editorial board suffices to show that this is not an ordinary journalistic episode, but perhaps a firm stand taken by the PD itself, which extends beyond the activities

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

of this diplomat in Tirana. Common sense suggests that the recent attack on Siebentricht is the PD's first public warning to the United States and is a riposte to its declarations about the elections in the Albania. In style, it is not very different from the statements Berisha made about European institutions in Crans Montana. On the day after the resolution of the European Parliament, he announced that the elections in Albania will be held only in the year 2000, implying that settling this question is an entirely Albanian matter and that the PD is not giving ground. The attack on Siebentricht seems to be a direct response to the State Department and an announcement that, if it insists on a repeat of the elections, Albania will not hesitate to hit back against the U.S. proposal.

If this reasoning is valid, the first question concerns the reasons behind the cooling in U.S.-Albanian relations and their prospects. It is a well-known fact that the United States used to be Berisha's main supporter and was a key player in his ascent to power. Moreover, it has supported Berisha in international relations and has tolerated Albania's internal problems with democracy. On the other hand, however, it must not be forgotten that Albania's place in the strategies of international politics is very modest, if not inconsiderable. It is mainly connected to the situation in Kosova and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], and depends on this. As a result, the United States has seldom really had a unified and well-studied policy for this little Balkan country. Relations with Albania have reflected less a strategy of the State Department than personal attitudes, sympathies, and interests.

The first serious problem that the small and tractable Balkan country created for U.S. policy was the Albanian-Greek conflict of August 1994 and the trial of the four members of the Greek minority. Berisha's determination not to give way to the Greeks provoked the anger of the powerful Greek lobby in the United States, which sounded the alarm in U.S. politics. To say the least, the first crack in Berisha's relations with Washington appeared at this moment. With its powerful representatives, the Greek lobby tried to impose a political embargo on Berisha and in a way succeeded. Since then, Berisha's main problems have involved those who deal with human rights, whose attitudes have led to two very harsh annual reports to Congress and incessant warnings.

It seems likely that Richard Sheaffer, one of the men in the White House and President Clinton's human rights adviser, is an advocate of a harsh policy toward the PD. This senior official suffered his diplomatic failure precisely over Albania. Sheaffer must have good relations with the Greek lobby in Washington. He was one of the main supporters and greatest friends of Berisha there. It appears that Sheaffer failed in Tirana. It is said that his plan was not accepted by Berisha and that his career did not experience its expected boost. The solution of the Albanian-Greek problem was attributed to Holbrooke, who scored additional points for his skills as a mediator. A cool relationship with Sheaffer and problems in the field of human rights put Albania in the sights of the State Department. The State Department's Human Rights Department, on the building's seventh floor, was the harshest of all on Berisha.

The visit of Assistant Secretary of State Timothy Worth, the most important figure in U.S. foreign policy involved in human rights, was to press home this point. Worth came to Tirana in order to ask the PD to respect the rules of the game at the elections and to hold them honestly. However, if a firm line on Berisha appeared to prevail in the State Department, he appears also to still have his supporters in Washington. In all probability, these are people in the Pentagon. It is a fact that Albanian-U.S. relations have shone mainly in the military field. William Perry, the U.S. secretary of defense himself, has journeyed twice to Tirana, and this cannot be accidental. Berisha seems to have concentrated his strategy to improve his image on this aspect.

Further evidence from Former President Bush's visit to Vlore confirms this analysis. If the Albanian press commented at length on Bush's weekend in Vlore and tried to fathom the reasoning behind it, few remembered to note that Bush, a man now officially outside politics, was accompanied by one of the most powerful individuals in the United States. This was the retired General Colin Powell, the former chief of the U.S. General Staff and the hero of the Gulf War. A declared Republican, Powell is one of the most popular figures in the United States today. He was seen as the surest candidate to defeat Clinton in the electoral race, and his withdrawal boosted the ratings of the current President. However, his story does not end there. Dole was determined in asking him to be his running mate for vice president in the November campaign, and his book of memoirs has been a best-seller for months. All polls put him at the head of the list of the most popular politicians, and his political involvement only increases as time passes. It seems that Berisha has sought to make use of none other than Powell in order to improve his image in the United States. He asked this of his supporters, and lo and behold, Powell, a career serviceman and one of the Pentagon's men, travelled to Vlore to listen to Berisha's arguments. Nobody knows what passed between them, but one thing is certain: Future developments will reflect what is happening in Washington.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Albania: Berisha Welcomes Yeltsin's 'Deserved' Victory

AU0407171296 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 4 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] President of the Republic Sali Berisha has welcomed the deserved victory of President Yeltsin, a victory that not only guarantees Russia's development on the road of democracy and the market economy, but constitutes an important factor for all of Europe and all democratic forces.

Albania: Chief of Army Staff, Italian Admiral Meet

AU0407202996 Tirana ATA in English 0905 GMT 4 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, July 3 (ATA)—Albanian military troops organised visits in two Italian warships which are in their second day in Albania, the Defence Ministry Press and Information Office said.

The Italian Admiral Galliccia met in the Defence Ministry with chief of the Albanian Army General Staff, Sheme Kosova, Vice Minister of Defence Policy Alfred Moisiu, and commander of Coastal Defence Forces, Rear Admiral Kucana.

The meeting voiced the connections, cooperation, and relations between the two armies and the actual work in concretizing and carrying out a bilateral agreement in the military field between Albania and Italy.

Albania: Dailies Call For PS 'Reformation'

AU0507070596 Tirana ATA in English 1326 GMT 4 Jul 96

["Albanian Press on Idea of Socialist Party Reformation"—ATA headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, July 4 (ATA)—The daily ZERI I POPULLIT in its editorial entitled "On Reformation" says: "Socialists are conscious that they should change not only some phrases of the party statute, not only some paragraphs of its program or some people in leadership but the country and society need from the Socialist Party [PS] first the most advanced mentality of the time, as a Social Democratic force of the Western European style."

GAZETA SHQIPTARE reports for "a crack in the PS" and cites a motion the PS Chairman Fatos Nano, sentenced to jail for falsification of documents and corruption, sent to his party. Nano orders an "urgent" congress of the party and "removal of Marx from the party program."

The same paper says that a letter was sent to the imprisoned leader on behalf of the "leadership mentor of the Socialists urging him 'to block the motion.'"

The daily ALBANIA carries an interview with Bashkim Zeneli, former member of the PS board known for his reformed ideas, under the title "PS Needs a New Face." In his interview Zeneli said: "I will not agree with the ideas of the leaders of the Socialist Party who say that the reform cycle of the party is closed, it has come to an end ... There is no room for fundamentalist, revanchist, or speculative elements in the party."

DITA INFORMACION carries the interview with the Socialist deputy Anastas Angjeli who said: "Common denominator for many PS leaders is that they think that it is the time for the PS to be reformed, to have a complete image of a social democratic party and realise the final break away from the shackles linking it with the past, the PLA [Party of Labor of Albania] and everything communist. It should reform the party leadership or better say renovate the leadership and improve its organisation, leadership and its working methods."

The daily RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE reports on the idea of reformation of the PS saying "it is not the question of a kind of renovation and reflection within the party but a reconfirmation of clans creating a combination of a part called the reformed and a part called the conservatives."

Citing the PS Deputy Chairman Ilir Meta, the daily REPUBLIKA says "reformation is a necessity for every Albanian party and particularly for the PS which comes out of the Labour party which has been the most obscurantist party compared to other parties of the communist East."

Meta's affirmation that "there were also revanchist elements in the PS," is considered by the daily TRIBUNA the worst accusation of this kind by one of the PS leaders.

Albania: PD Leader Denies PS Asked for Dialogue

AU0307193696 Tirana ATA in English 1306 GMT 3 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, July 3 (ATA)—The Democratic Party [PD] Chairman Tritan Shehu has told the newspaper RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE that: "The Socialist Party [PS] has filed no request for dialogue with the Democratic Party."

"The PS on Tuesday has asked dialogue with the PD, but it has filed its request to the newspaper KOHA JONE and not to the democrats' headquarters," RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE reports.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

"I have personally sent PS and other parliamentary parties an invitation for a meeting, but officially, not through the press," Shehu said.

The democrat leader considers these acts mere speculations serving only as propaganda means.

"Before the PS files its request for a meeting with PD to the press, it should file it to the one it is invited by," Shehu said, adding that his party would take into consideration the requests for bilateral meetings with other political forces only when invitations arrived at PD headquarters.

However, Shehu has expressed his party's readiness to hold bilateral and multilateral meetings with political forces, suffice these are organised meetings and within ethic principles.

On the other hand he said that the PD was holding a series of meetings with political forces of the center left and the right wing parties with the aim to structure the new parliament and government.

The Socialist Party in a special press release published on Tuesday in the newspaper ZERI I POPULLIT said that the PS would not take part in the consultations organised by the parliamentary parties on problems of the current parliament. The statement, the release said, was linked with the latest invitations addressed to the PS on behalf of President Berisha and the PD chairman for negotiations...."

In conclusion, the press release said that the PS invited the PD to a bilateral meeting.

Albania: PS Official Reportedly Fled With Party Funds

AU0407170996 Tirana ATA in English 1321 GMT 4 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, July 4 (ATA)—The General Secretary of the Socialist Party [PS] Gramoz Ruci has fled Albania and his return is unknown, daily GAZETA SHQIPTARE reports today.

The daily said that Ruci's departure has thrown doubts on the ranks of other PS leaders "moreover when his withdrawal of the Socialist secretary takes place, according to a member of the PS board whose name has not been revealed, at a moment when the main party of the opposition is experiencing its greatest political processes."

"He should have stayed with us," the daily cites the same member as saying.

Commenting on the news, the daily ALBANIA says: "Ruci, the man of Fatos Nano, his iron fist when it is the case of Byzantium plots, has fled Albania clandestinely. Beria of the Socialist Party has not 'preferred to take part in the great battle,' in the Socialist Party and has disappeared mysteriously."

Citing sources within the PS, ALBANIA writes that "Ruci who has left for Nigeria has withdrawn $220,000 from the party funds."

The paper says that a few days before Ruci has presented an order to the PS board from Fatos Nano, leader of the PS who is found guilty and sentenced to jail on charges of embezzlement and abuse of office in relation to an aid scandal in 1991 when he was prime minister. Nano ordered the dissolution of the present PS board and other orders which were delegated to Ruci.

Citing reliable party inner sources, the paper says that Ruci has fled Albania and Nano was aware of this action.

Albania: PS Presidium Asks Nano To Withdraw Motion

AU0507094896 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 4 Jul 96 p 3

[Report by Elio Elini: "Socialist Party Presidium Sent Letter to Bence Yesterday—'Chairman, Withdraw the Motion'—Nano's Motion Means Clashes in the Socialist Party"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A crisis in the Socialist Party [PS]? The motion drawn up in Bence Prison by party chairman Nano appears to have shaken the unity of the largest opposition party. The first clash has taken place between the Socialists' number one and the other party leaders. The urgent summons of a PS congress before the end of July with the same delegates that attended the congress's first phase [23 March] and a report to be drawn up by a group outside the party presidium are the main points in a motion that was strongly contested yesterday by the members of the PS's leading think tank. "Nano, withdraw the motion" was the cry that went out to the imprisoned Socialist leader. An extraordinary meeting of the presidium will discuss the preparation and organization of the congress.

The most recent instructions from Nano for his party were summarized in 10 points. The motion drafted in his prison cell was delivered to the desks of the PS Presidium two days ago by Pandeli Majko. The former chairman of the Eurosocialist Youth Forum, who with nine others has also signed the document drawn up by the present leader, has announced that many others have now started to sign, too. The motion itself will pass to the General Management Committee for approval on Monday [8 July].

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

The order issued from Bence states: "The second phase of the congress will take place on 28 July, and all the PS district conferences will be completed by 12 July." In this way, Nano has brought forward by two months the date for this most important party event that the presidium had planned for September. The delegates to the congress will not be reselected. "Let the delegates be the same people as assembled for the congress's first phase," writes the imprisoned leader. The party presidium is not to be involved in drafting the congress report. "It must be prepared by a group outside the presidium," orders Nano, also proposing changes to the program and the statute. It appears that this time the PS will bid farewell to Marx. The Socialists have been bitterly attacked and accused of nostalgia because of his controversial name. Nano gave him short shrift: "Cut him out of the program." The motion has been signed by 10 members of the Management Committee and intellectuals who, Majko says, are also gathering other signatures.

Nano's step was not greeted with applause at PS headquarters. The response was immediate, and objections were raised to many points in the motion. Yesterday afternoon, the PS Presidium sent a letter to the imprisoned leader anxiously calling for the withdrawal of the motion. The first comments came yesterday afternoon during an aktiv of the Tirana Branch of the Eurosocialist Youth Forum. Speaking from the rostrum, Hajdaraga, Meta, Angjeli, Ulqini, and Poci did not accept the ideas offered by Nano. The delegates to the congress must be reselected by the grass roots. "No congress with communist delegates," Angjeli said. Meanwhile, PS Deputy Chairman Hajdaraga was against a second phase of the congress. "This must be the third party congress," he said. Nor did he swallow the proposal for the report to be drafted by people outside the presidium. "The renewal of the party cannot be accomplished by a group within or outside the PS," Hajdaraga announced, thus excluding the possibility of his seizing the reformist banner. Poci, PS deputy chairman for Tirana, was even more forthright. "The PS must strike against those pseudo-democrats who are trying to throw a wrench into the works while claiming to reform the party."

Nano's motion has for the first time caused a major clash between the party presidium and the Socialist leader himself, on whom the PS has relied for its policies for the last few years and during the most recent election campaign. The meeting of the Management Committee that will examine Nano's proposal will be the moment when the real leadership of the PS will become apparent.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Bulgaria: MP's Ask Greek Minister About Pomak Issue

AU0307131196 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 3 Jul 96 p 1

["DUMA PRESS" report]

[FBIS Translated Text] BTA reports that at his meeting with Prime Minister Zhan Videnov in Sofia on 2 July, Yeoryios Romaios, the Greek minister responsible for European integration [name and position as published], announced that a special office will be opened at the Greek Foreign Ministry to deal with cooperation with Bulgaria and our association with the EU. Romaios reaffirmed to the prime minister that Athens fully supports our closer association with all the European institutions. The Greek minister declared that he is glad that Bulgaria's future is in the hands of young people.

At his meeting with the prime minister and during his talks with the National Assembly Commission on Foreign Policy and European Integration, Mr. Romaios discussed the forthcoming meeting of the Balkan foreign ministers. The National Assembly deputies insisted on a clarification of Greece's official position regarding the Pomak ethnic group and the Pomak language. Romaios assured the commission that the matter related to personal views held by Greek officials. Later the Greek minister had a meeting with President Zhelev.

Bulgaria: Russian Interior Ministry Official Accredited to Sofia

AU0507122996 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 5 Jul 96 p 2

[Unattributed report under rubric "Reporter": "Russian Interior Ministry Now Has Its Representative in Bulgaria"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 4 July Interior Minister Nikolay Dobrev and Russian Ambassador Aleksandr Avdeyev discussed the interaction and expansion of cooperation between the Bulgarian and Russian Interior Ministries. At the meeting Yuriy Yermolayev, the newly accredited representative of the Russian Interior Ministry in Bulgaria, was presented to Minister Dobrev. Yesterday Nikolay Dobrev also held discussions on the same issues with German Ambassador Peter Metzger and with Rose Likins, charge d'affaires ad interim of the U.S. Embassy in Sofia.

Bulgaria: Pavlov To Demand Increase in Army Budget

AU0507143196 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 5 Jul 96 p 4

[Article by Irena Marinova and Vasil Lyutskanov: "The Army Needs a Further 33 Billion Leva To Survive"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the meeting of the cabinet on 4 July, it emerged that Defense Minister Dimitur Pavlov will propose updating the army budget to fully compensate for inflation, so that the troops can survive until the end of 1996.

We want to recoup everything that we have lost from inflation, Minister Pavlov told TRUD. Finance Minister Dimitur Kostov confirmed that the adjustment of the budget will take into account an annual inflation rate of about 100 percent. Parliament voted to grant the army 33,485 billion leva for 1996. This means that the Defense Ministry will want at least another 33 billion leva for this year.

TRUD has already reported that the Defense Ministry has not yet placed orders for uniforms and clothing for the October intake of conscripts. At the end of 1995, when the dollar exchange rate was 75 leva, the daily allowance for the soldiers' food was set at 135 leva per man. Since then, the dollar exchange rate has more than doubled. The rear supply organizations are still managing to fill the soldiers' canteens thanks to their ancillary activities, which provide the army with 85 percent of its meat, 40 percent of its eggs, and 25 percent of its milk. Recently the Defense Ministry owed 300 million leva for fuel alone, which has risen in price by 80 percent. The ministry owed 160 million leva to tailoring, footwear, and textile firms and 250 million leva to the military repair plants. From the beginning of May, the Defense Ministry trimmed its expenditure by 25 percent to enable the planned summer maneuvers to be carried out. The experts are adamant that following the maneuvers no money will be available for anything. However, a 20 percent increase is planned of the pay of all servicemen, according to their rank and duties, after which junior lieutenants will draw at least 15,000 leva a month.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Czech Republic: Replacement of IFOR Battalion Begins 4 Jul

AU0407165096 Prague PRAVO in Czech 4 Jul 96 p 2

[Report by "(per)": "A Changeover in IFOR as of 4 July"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The replacement of the Czech IFOR [Implementation Force] battalion in Bosnia will commence on 4 July. The Defense Ministry's press service has confirmed this for PRAVO. Some 350 new troops, who should replace the same number of their colleagues in the IFOR mission in Bosnia this month, have been undergoing training since May at the UN peacekeeping forces training center in Cesky Krumlov. The majority of the new troops, however, will be transported to Bosnia on 25 and 31 July.

Czech Republic: Postelection Situation 'Complicates' NATO Entry

AU0507113196 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 2 Jul 96 p 8

[Article by Jiri Pehe: "The Czech Republic and NATO After the Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The postelection arrangement of political forces in the Czech Republic complicates decisionmaking not only on important domestic political issues, but also possibly on one of the most crucial foreign policy issues—the issue of our membership in NATO. Although, during the first postelection meetings of the so-called state-forming parties—that is, the coalition parties and the Social Democrats—with President Havel, mutual assurances were given that there is agreement on the country's foreign policy orientation, a closer look suggests that the views of the Social Democrats on membership in NATO, and especially on the means of reaching a decision on the domestic scene, are not identical with the views of the coalition.

For example, even up until last year it was not clear if the Social Democrats are in favor of membership in NATO; their various pronouncements rather suggested that they are not. Social Democratic agreement with membership in NATO is accompanied by three important "buts." Neither personnel from the armies of the other NATO member countries nor nuclear weapons should be deployed on the territory of the Czech Republic. The decision on membership in NATO should be made in a referendum.

All three coalition parties favor membership in NATO without any conditions, and, so far, all three have insisted that the decision on membership should be made by a vote in parliament and not in a referendum, even though the position of the People's Party on this point was not quite unequivocal. If the governing coalition had won the elections as convincingly as it did four years ago, membership in NATO, if it were eventually really to be offered to the Czech Republic, would be approved in parliament without a referendum. Thus, a potentially awkward problem would be avoided; despite the major endeavors by President Havel and coalition politicians for membership, Czech citizens are divided on the issue of membership and, if a referendum were to be held, are somewhat "unreliable."

If we look at the various public opinion polls, roughly one-third of citizens are unequivocally in favor of entry into NATO, one-third do not know, and one-third are opposed. Although it is clear that these ratios could change substantially, until a real discussion is held throughout society, the outcome of a referendum seems uncertain at the moment. Given the new arrangement of political forces following the elections, this fact makes the position of Czech politicians considerably more complicated in their negotiations with the representatives of Western democracies on membership in NATO.

While it was clear in the past that, if NATO decides to admit the Czech Republic, the domestic confirmation of membership would be a mere parliamentary formality, at present it seems likely that the opposition, in which the republicans and the communists are categorically opposed to entry into NATO, will insist on a referendum. Although it is possible that a few votes could be found among the Social Democratic ranks that would eventually make possible the approval of membership by parliament alone, the Social Democrats would be politically in opposition to themselves if they were to back down from their demand for a referendum.

Given the considerable lack of unity among citizens regarding the issue of membership, it seems that a parliamentary decision would be somewhat unpopular. At the same time, the Social Democrats could, with the aid of a referendum, rid themselves of responsibility for a decision on an issue in which there is no unity in their party.

Of course, the scenario in which a referendum figures is unpleasant for the Czech politicians who will negotiate abroad on the membership issue. It is clear that NATO will be rather more cautious in a situation in which a possible offer of membership could be turned down in a referendum.

This development does not necessarily have to be negative—namely, as on many other issues, the coalition will have to discuss and persuade and not just push through what it wants. The electoral success of the Social Democrats has already contributed and is still con-

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

tributing to a certain edification of Czech political culture. It is necessary to seek compromises in political life, and, in issues where such a major decision is involved, such as membership in NATO, it will probably be necessary to convince most of society first. It would become apparent during this process of convincing to what extent the Social Democrats take membership seriously and to what extent their demand for a referendum is a mere attempt to render membership in NATO impossible.

Membership in NATO would certainly be incredibly important for the Czech Republic for security, symbolic, and international political reasons. But, at the same time, it is essential for there to be no doubt that such a vital decision by the young democracy was made truly democratically. In a situation in which the governing coalition would have a decisive majority in parliament, it could be possible to argue that the mere decision of parliament on membership represents the will of society. But, in the current stalemate situation, it will obviously be necessary to ask the voters this question directly.

Czech Republic: Prime Minister Assesses Army's Main Tasks

LD0407153096 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1400 GMT 4 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] After the first session of the newly appointed government, Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus officially introduced Defense Minister Miroslav Vyborny to his post. On this occasion he spoke about the main tasks awaiting the Army in the coming period:

[Begin Klaus recording] We know that the Army does not exist in a vacuum. The Army exists in our society. First, there must be maximum communication, there should not be isolation, and the issue of this country's defense must be felt by all of our society, rather than by just a few professionals.

Second, the transformation process must be completed. It has been started, some of its phases have been completed, but there is scope for finer tuning.

Third, several important decisions are awaiting us as far as some weapon systems or the Air Force are concerned.

Fourth, this Army should be prepared for full membership in NATO. I think these tasks are more than sufficient. [end recording]

Czech Republic: Zeman Views New Role, Coalition Cooperation

AU0307152696 Prague PRAVO in Czech 29 Jun 96 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Milos Zeman, CSSD chairman and Chamber of Deputies chairman, by Nada Adamickova and Marie Konigova in Prague; date not given: "Democracy Based on Corruption Is No Longer Democracy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [PRAVO] During your election as Chamber chairman, the leader of the People's Party club declared that he would support you with the proviso that you support the policy statement. It seems like a deal was made. Was it?

[Zeman] I proceed from the speech made by the president at Prague Castle after the meeting of the four political parties. In it, he said clearly that the Social Democrats should negotiate with the coalition parties on the options for supporting a coalition government. The president called upon the coalition parties again recently to discuss this subject with the Social Democrats. I am ready for this discussion any time.

[PRAVO] Given the numbers in the Chamber, the coalition only needs to lure across a couple of people so that the balance of forces changes in its favor. Apparently, it is also looking for them among the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] members.

[Zeman] Democracy based on corruption is no longer democracy. As far as the corruptibility of the CSSD deputies is concerned, I may be naive, but I would like to express my complete confidence that this will not happen.

[PRAVO] You declared once that you would like to sit in parliament in order to exercise a supervisory function over the government. By virtue of your post as Chamber chairman, as it has been perceived until now, you will have an opportunity to intervene only minimally in the proceedings.

[Zeman] I do not think you are right. If I were defined merely as a person who pounds his gavel, you would be right. But the chairman of the Chamber is a person who should either be a kind of government lever, if he is from a governing party, or a person who is afflicted with the Beckett syndrome and thus strives to ensure that parliament is an institution that supervises the government thoroughly. And it is absolutely clear that this Beckett syndrome is far more likely to manifest itself in an opposition politician than in a politician from the governing coalition.

[PRAVO] So, how do you envision this supervision of the government?

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Zeman] This issue does not just involve supervision of the fulfillment of the government's policy statement because it seems that this will be a relatively general document, and that is good.

It will involve supervising the government's activity through our work in the individual committees, through consideration of the government's draft laws, and through particular legislative initiatives, both from the specialist committees and the party clubs. And last, but not least, I think that, apart from these already ingrained forms of supervision, it would be appropriate for the institute of commissions of inquiry to be considered for serious issues affecting the whole of society. The Chamber's rules of procedure require them, but, so far, they have almost never been applied.

[PRAVO] Which ones specifically do you have in mind?

[Zeman] A commission of inquiry has to be approved by a simple majority of the Chamber, whereas in neighboring Germany, for example, such a commission can be established if 20 percent of the deputies ask for it. I think we should move closer to the German model.

[PRAVO] Do you think you could promote your earlier demand for supervision of privatization through a commission of inquiry?

[Zeman] Privatization, as an extensive transfer of property, involved both the creation of specific and motivated owners and the illegal acquisition of wealth. I would like us to be able to separate these two forms. We have also, for example, criticized the fact that a judicial review of the privatization projects is not possible, and parliament obviously should make use of its supervisory powers here.

[PRAVO] The center of gravity of the new Chamber's work will shift from the committees to the deputies' clubs. There was a debate within the CSSD concerning whether you, as party chairman, would not be more effectual as club chairman. Why did you eventually make the opposite decision?

[Zeman] I read a comment by Jan Ruml recently that the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] would collapse without Vaclav Klaus. It was a comment that perhaps flattered Vaclav Klaus, but it definitely did not flatter the ODS because he had defined it as a typical party of one man. I would certainly not want the CSSD to be a party of one man. I would like identifiable political figures capable of holding various posts to advance in it gradually. One such figure is Stanislav Gross. He is a young but very competent deputy who led our club in the last electoral term. I believe that he will also lead it well now.

[PRAVO] The representatives of the coalition have declared that they will submit the government's policy statement to your party prior to its discussion in the Chamber. Do you already know about certain of its points that you will not support?

[Zeman] This is an issue for a specific matter-of-fact discussion, whose outcome I would not like to anticipate. Therefore, I would concentrate only on providing a kind of illustration: This involves the issue of health care. You certainly know that the views of the Social Democrats and the ODS in particular differ considerably in this sphere. We proceed from the premise that each of us pays health and sickness benefit insurance. By the way, we have nothing against their merger as contained in the government's proposed policy statement. Health care, from this point of view, is not free. For this very reason, each of us pays this insurance. But it has to be solidaristic; that is, it should not be based on the financial participation of the patient because most of the sick are, understandably, the elderly. And for them, expenditure on paid health care represents a not inconsiderable item of their budget. We consider this to be immoral in a situation in which dozens of health insurance companies are taking in disproportionate sums for their overhead costs, and foreign pharmaceutical companies, in particular, are making enormous profits here. We will therefore challenge any formulation in the government's policy statement that, instead of endeavoring to rationalize expenditures to the detriment of the insurance companies and these pharmaceutical firms, would intend to increase further the patient's share in covering the costs of his treatment. This is an absolutely specific example, and I could cite dozens of them.

[PRAVO] There are points in the coalition agreement that will certainly not suit your party but could appear in the policy statement—for example, church restitution and the inalterability of the pension age. What about them?

[Zeman] I differentiate between the policy points contained in the coalition agreement, because they are a matter for these coalition parties, and the definitive version of the policy statement. In any case, I think it would be fitting to maintain the principle whereby the most contentious issues simply do not appear in the policy statement and that such an issue be resolved by a specific parliamentary debate on this or that law. This, of course, concerns not only the pension age, but also, for example, fees at the universities. Let the government submit a draft university law to parliament that proposes fees, and the Social Democrats will just vote against the law or the appropriate section of it. And, after the debate, let the democratic majority decide.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[PRAVO] Was this issue a subject of your talks with Vaclav Klaus on Thursday [27 June]?

[Zeman] I assume that these talks will continue, and I have already said several times that, in principle, I agree with the formulation of Vaclav Klaus that there should not be anything in this policy statement that would offend anyone. Issues concerning the current political situation from the point of view of the workability of the parliamentary bodies were the subject of our meeting on Thursday. It was mainly about these matters.

[PRAVO] How will the CSSD justify to its voters the presence in the government of Ministers Jan Ruml and Jindrich Vodicka, against whom your party spoke out bitterly immediately after the elections?

[Zeman] I have already said several times that what we agreed upon at the Castle will still be the subject of further negotiation and, on the other hand, that these personnel issues will not be turned into a media event. If we were to uphold the view that party advantage is the priority for us, we would even support passionately some of the proposed ministers because they would sui generis discredit the governing coalition's policy. But, because I believe that the priority interest should be the interest of this country and its citizens, I think our reservations are justified; nevertheless, we are willing to say that we do not want to turn them into a media event. When all is said and done, the most recent public opinion polls expressing the level of popularity of certain politicians conducted this media event for us.

[PRAVO] As one of the three most senior men in the state, how do you envision cooperation with the prime minister and the president? Will the tradition of joint meetings before every Chamber session continue to apply?

[Zeman] I have never turned down any kind of meeting with anyone, let alone with the president. Incidentally, the desire for future cooperation was expressed in the congratulatory telegram the president sent me on Thursday. I look forward to this cooperation?

[PRAVO] And with the prime minister?

[Zeman] It is quite natural for the chairman of the Chamber of Deputies to cooperate with the prime minister-designate.

[PRAVO] In your first address to parliament, you expressed a wish to guide the country through the whole four-year electoral period. Do you believe this?

[Zeman] Minority governments can be stable and unstable. It does not apply automatically that every minority government is unstable. Of course, a condition for the stability of a minority government is the ability of the minority parties to reach an agreement with the opposition. So it is up to the coalition parties to attempt such an agreement. To what extent this agreement is functional on both sides also depends on the coalition parties.

[PRAVO] Do you think the post of Chamber chairman can increase your popularity, or vice versa? The first day of your term of office was marked by an exchange of words with Miroslav Sladek, that this will not be easy...

[Zeman] I am aware that I am assuming the leadership of the institution that was the least popular of all of the institutions in this country. I think that an individual should be attracted by demanding tasks. There is nothing easier than heading an institution that is generally popular. But, if, during my term of office, I manage to improve parliament's popularity, I will regard this not only as my personal success, but also the success of the whole Chamber.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Slovakia: Kovac Sends Congratulations to Yeltsin

LD0407200496 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 4 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Slovak President Michal Kovac has sent a telegram of congratulations to Boris Yeltsin on his reelection to the post of president of the Russian Federation.

On this occasion, I would like to express my belief that friendly relations and mutually beneficial cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Slovak Republic will continue to develop successfully and be further strengthened, the telegram reads.

Slovakia: Barnier-Hoyer Talks With Authorities 'Tense'

BR0307143596 Paris LE FIGARO in French 3 Jul 96 p 4

[Article by Baudoin Bollaert: "French-German Visit to Bratislava"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Now this is something unheard of. Two ministers, one from France, the other from Germany—Michel Barnier and Werner Hoyer, in charge of European Affairs—paid a joint formal visit to a third country. They chose Slovakia, because neither of them had ever been there, but above all because Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's authoritarian bent worries Paris and Bonn.

There is something peculiar about Slovakia: While it has managed to surprise everyone with its outstanding economic and social performance, only three years after parting ways with the Czech Republic, politically it has been going through a kind of "cold civil war" that in many respects is incompatible with its stated intention of joining the EU.

These days there are not many foreign visitors coming to Bratislava. Hence the impact of Messrs. Barnier and Hoyer's visit. In addition to Vladimir Meciar and his "intimate foe," head of state Michal Kovac, they met with the president of the Slovak parliament as well as opposition leaders. The conversations were often "tense," French sources say.

Mafia-Like Tendencies

The French-German message was simple: Beside the acceptance of the whole EU framework, membership in the EU presupposes deeply rooted democratic practices and the unchallenged rule of law. "However, in Slovakia, practices inherited from communism remain deep-seated," a diplomat points out. Not to mention mafia-like tendencies (drugs, corruption, etc.). [passage omitted]

Facing the four journalists (two from France and two from Germany) he has courteously welcomed into a small sitting room, Mr. Meciar has a convalescent's slightly fixed gaze. But his answers are clear. "There is no suspect piece of legislation in Slovakia. Freedom is guaranteed." What about his run-ins with the head of state? "Poland has had similar problems." The Russian elections? "With his Communist rhetoric, Zyuganov has no way out." The allocation of the mobile telephone market in Slovakia? "France has the best chances." [passage omitted]

While he is proud of Slovakia's economic performance, Mr. Meciar knows that for his country joining the EU and NATO is not going to be easy. "We need time," he admitted. He even mentioned a date between the years 2000 and 2010.

Messrs. Hoyer and Barnier took good note of this. Without "lecturing" or "burning any bridge" they feel that they managed to convey what they had to say. Are they going to make other joint visits? The answer is yes. "But this time outside Europe," they say enigmatically.

Slovakia: Doctors Advise Meciar To Convalesce Longer

AU0307163696 Bratislava SME in Slovak 3 Jul 96 p 2

[Article by "jam, sp": "Physicians Recommend Two More Months of Convalescence for Prime Minister Meciar"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Bratislava—The vacation season should have no impact on the government, which will continue to hold sessions in the months of July and August without any vacation break. This transpired from Government Spokeswoman L. Bulakova's words during yesterday's cabinet meeting. Asked about Vladimir Meciar's leave plans, his spokeswoman M. Pospisilova said: "The physicians recommend to him two more months of convalescence. For the time being, Vladimir Meciar wants to solve this by working two or three days a week and taking the other two days off partly to relax, provided that his work obligations and the political situation permit this." However, she also conceded the possibility of the prime minister taking off a couple of weeks. Asked about the state of the prime minister's health, Pospisilova replied: "The latest events and the workload certainly have not helped the prime minister. Last week he had a minimum of sleep." [passage omitted]

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Hungary: Kovacs on Yeltsin Victory, Russian Foreign Policy

LD0407185596 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1730 GMT 4 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs hopes that with Boris Yeltsin's reelection current Russian foreign policy will continue. Kovacs hopes that Russia will not put any obstacles in front of Hungary's accession to NATO.

[Begin Kovacs recording] Russia has so far not voiced any concrete reservation against Hungary's Euro-Atlantic orientation efforts and the fact that Hungary wishes to become member of the Euro-Atlantic community, the European Union, the Western European Union, and NATO. We expect that Russia will not voice any reservations in the future either. Russia accepts that this is an issue between Hungary and NATO, Hungary and the EU. [end recording]

Hungary: Security Cabinet Agrees To Fight Economic Crime

AU0307131896 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 3 Jul 96 pp 1, 4

[Report by an unattributed correspondent: "Horn Sticks to the Idea of Main Directorate for Criminal Investigation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Hungarian Government's National Security Cabinet held a meeting chaired by Prime Minister Gyula Horn on 2 July. Present at the meeting were the interior, finance, and justice ministers, as well as the chairman of the Supreme Court, the Chief Prosecutor, the national commanders of the Border Police, Police, and Customs, and the chairman of the Office of Tax and Fiscal Auditing.

NEPSZABADSAG has learned that the participants at this meeting, which lasted over an hour, agreed that a central organization that will fight the black economy more effectively than hitherto should be set up within the police. No agreement was reached, however, on whether the new organization should operate within the Main Criminal Investigation Department currently led by Antal Kacziba, or under the leadership of a new deputy chief commander charged with this specific task.

After the meeting, Interior Minister Gabor Kuncze told journalists that the National Security Cabinet had decided on which of the two proposals to submit to the government meeting on 4 July, but he refrained from providing details about the proposal, because Security Cabinet meetings are not public. At the same time, Gabor Kuncze confirmed that the Hungarian Police would receive the approximately 1 billion forints aimed at setting up a central investigation office to improve the fight against black economy.

The Security Cabinet also agreed to strengthen the department of special affairs within the Customs and Excise Department, as well as on the proposal to strengthen cooperation between this department and the Office of Tax and Fiscal Auditing. The cabinet also agreed on the need to improve the training of judges and attorneys engaged in economic defense and to increase their number.

Hungary: Editorial Views Freedom of Investigative Journalism

AU0207090896 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 1 Jul 96 p 6

[Editorial by MAGYAR NARANCS journalist Laszlo Seres: "The Newest Hungary"—pun on UJ MAGYARORSZAG, "New Hungary"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Rather than just enabling it to give information or to become a forum for debate, the American press was made free to investigate in great detail society's power organizations, including bureaucratic power at all levels of government. (...) Journalists must vigilantly ensure that public affairs be managed in public." I have probably copied this short passage of the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) completely in vain. First, because, due to some general and national anti-Americanism, everything American is repulsive here and, second, if it is not repulsive, then it is unattainable and distant; this is when the sigh comes that we will never have America here. However, it would not do any harm to know that, if anything—apart from the free market and individual and minority rights—then the area of media rights and obligations and the ruling power's control over the media should be "Americanized."

What is the situation here? In Hungary, a journalist from an opposition newspaper is thrown out of the office of the biggest governing party's parliamentary group leader with a "Get out!" in a style that neither the communists nor Antall's media-war people permitted themselves to use.

OK, this is not the biggest problem in Hungary, after all, the constitution concept has not been passed, the number of hospital beds is being decreased, and orphans are sold through the Internet. Nevertheless, the government's style is a reflection of the current state of affairs. We can be sure that Katalin Bossanyi, the NEPSZABADSAG journalist who uncovered the Princz-Palotas joint business, would not have suffered such an insult.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Naturally, we do not have to like UJ MAGYARORSZAG—which not so long ago was concerned about Jewish immigrants to Hungary—the "pure voice," due to whose extreme tone the owners fired the chief editor a few weeks ago, however, we should not assess it even to this extent if we do not want to fall into the trap of Hornism-Szekeresism: Assessing a newspaper on the basis of its world view and style, rather than assessing the possible justification of the questions it asks and to reply in a way befitting it and us, the public. UJ MAGYARORSZAG is as it is. Due to its nature—a functioning newspaper, be it soc-lib or conservative—it "scrutinizes the power organs of society in full," and Imre Szekeres is one such organ (mixed metaphor).

If what the UJ MAGYARORSZAG writes is true, Szekeres's underling threw out the journalist because he asked from what funds the parliamentary group leader had built his villa and swimming pool in Buda. At the time of going to press, there is no reason to assume that there is anything irregular about it, the newspaper could not prove this, either and, as a private person, Szekeres can build what he wants. As a public figure, as a factor (organ) of power maintained from our taxes, it would be kind of an obligation for him to make his financial affairs transparent because it is clearly a public matter whether his pool has some of our money in it. It is a commonplace but unfortunately we sometimes have to repeat it: A newspaper has the right to make a nuisance of itself and politicians—this is part of their position—have to forget about their private self. (Hungarian citizen Gyula Horn also cannot have a private opinion on the death penalty. He is the prime minister.) In the United States, the president, the representatives, and their spouses make ordinary and public statements of their assets, and their shady affairs (like the Whitewater) are vigilantly watched by the media, which try to investigate these.

In recent days, UJ MAGYARORSZAG has made an attempt at investigative journalism, but the reaction of the affected organ tended toward a meaningless hush-up. The prime minister's denial in connection with the Horn villa case left more questions unanswered than it closed (precisely how much he paid for it, were eastern guest-workers employed illegally...?). Robert Muranyi, deputy chief director of the Postabank Rt., first denied in UJ MAGYARORSZAG on 20 June that Postabank Invest, the bank's construction and investment branch, had participated in the business but a week later he "considered it an honor" that Gyula Horn also used their services as one of the company's 3 million customers (UJ MAGYARORSZAG, 27 June). The company denied that, with their help, the prime minister had bought a valuable property below the normal price—and the newspaper was unable to prove its claims. However, in possession of some information, this cannot be a reason for not questioning the prime minister's house building. (Accepting, naturally, that the false Hungarian Justice and Life Party demonstration [in front of Horn's villa], motivated by social jealousy—"a left-wing prime minister who protects ordinary people should not have a three-story villa"—was a result of the demagogic presentation of the issue).

According to the head of a public opinion research company, this "coat theft" case will definitely have repercussions for Horn, regardless of whether the case is clean or not. However, UJ MAGYARORSZAG will suffer a lot from it, it will be more difficult for it to get "official" information, it will be treated paternalistically in an offhand manner, and it will get into a tolerated status (which is dangerous because financially it is not very stable). Medium-rank and mediocre officials will assess on the telephone whether to give interviews to it. I am familiar with this problem because MAGYAR NARANCS was in the same situation during UJ MAGYARORSZAG's government party era. People who, due to some mistake in history, considered themselves "politicians," began by describing our newspaper's articles and language at length before they generously condescended to give an interview in a language hardly resembling Hungarian.

As if the media was not doing a great big favor to politicians by publishing even their craziest ideas. As if politics did not live from the media.

Recently, the Freedom House mentioned the partiality of certain Hungarian newspapers as the reason for not listing the media situation in the "completely free" category. We can certainly add that the majority of the socialist newspapers are indeed rather biased and, apart from MAGYAR NEMZET, UJ MAGYARORSZAG is the only national-right wing newspaper, so ethically it can be expected of the power at least to handle its injuries a bit more elegantly. Naturally, it would be even better if we also had a "law on freedom of information," as the United States has had for 30 years (Freedom of Information Act). If journalists do not have the basic right of freedom to get access to the work of government offices, they will never be able to report on what happens to the money from our taxes; and if our public affairs get gradually less public then they will eventually disappear and this will be the end of democracy. No private crimes, no public morals.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

B-H: Daily Notes Lack of Agreement on Defense Law

AU0507123396 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 5 Jul 96 p 4

[Article by A.P.: "Still Without Agreement"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although optimistically announced by U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry the day before, agreement on the final form of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation's Defense Law had not been reached even on Thursday.

Later in the day, we tried on several occasions to contact Federation Defense Minister Vladimir Soljic and his deputy Hasan Cengic, but every time somebody from their offices told us that they were at a meeting. Edisa Razman of the Defense Ministry's public relations office told us the same, and expressed doubt that the law would be agreed upon by the end of the day. We have received the latest information from the office of the deputy defense minister, according to which shortly after 1930 [1730 GMT] consultations were still in progress.

The day before, after a meeting with Perry, Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, announced that on Wednesday and Thursday [3 and 4 July] they will meet to try to settle misunderstandings related to the law. On that occasion Izetbegovic stated that the only disputed question was command over the army, that is, "the domain of civilian command pursuant to the Dayton accord."

B-H: Future Military Financing, Structure Discussed

AU0407203696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 4 Jul 96

[Report by Sefik Mujkic—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Studio announcer] The current situation and the future tasks and obligations of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army was reviewed at today's meeting of the General Staff and commanders of all B-H Army corps and divisions, and the Defense Ministry at the level of deputy and assistant ministers in the Bosnia-Herzegovina government. Sefik Mujkic has the details.

[Begin recording] [Mujkic] The talks focused on the future financing and maintenance of our army, the construction of facilities in peace time, and the demobilization of troops and equipment. It was stressed that all the army's structures are facing a period of substantial obligations that pertain to the establishment of a professional army. The issue of its organization, number, financing, and training, and how the Defense Ministry and General Staff would contribute to the Train and Equip project were reviewed. Following a long meeting, Hasan Cengic, deputy defense minister in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government, in an interview with Radio Television Bosnia-Herzegovina, explained the stance taken regarding the size of the future professional army:

[Cengic] We have taken a stance regarding the basic number of professional troops in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, which will be a part of the professional Federation army; of course, this is just a proposal to be presented to political institutions, which will then make the decision and it will have to be coordinated with the Croatian side as a definite stance that, after the passing of the Defense Law, will be submitted to relevant bodies for adoption. What we can say at this point is that the number is within the limits and principles established in the (?disarmament) agreement reached in Vienna.

[Mujkic] Deputy Defense Minister Hasan Cengic stressed that today's meeting had not touched upon the announced passing of the Defense Law [words indistinct] additional coordination.

[Cengic] We are now conducting talks at the highest political level on the crucial issues that are still controversial. Yesterday we met with U.S. Defense Secretary Perry and his aides. President Izetbegovic, Mr. Zubak, and others expressed interest and readiness to pass the law and find solutions. We expect that the solutions will be found in the coming days.

B-H: Suitability of Weapons Provided by U.S. Questioned

AU2006173496 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 15 Jun 96 pp 14-15

[Article by Dario Barbalic: "Helicopters From Way Back in the Vietnam War"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although the Federal Assembly has had great difficulties with the document on the subregional arms limitation as well as with the adoption of the Defense Law, they informed the public about the initial quantity of weapons the Federation is to obtain within the U.S. program of military help, which is $100 million worth. The nature of those arms reveals in what way the world intends to strike a military balance in Bosnia-Herzegovina—and probably in the wider region—after Dayton. The weapons are not the latest models—at present they are second-best in their class—and the quantity is smaller than expected.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Training Began in Turkey

During the preliminary negotiations with the U.S. side, the Bosnian side had expressed their concern about the modernity of weapons they were going to obtain. However, the Americans claimed that the federal partners would be satisfied, especially if they consider how much they would get for $100 million. Nevertheless, the total sum promised as help to the Federation is more than $900 million—a smaller part in money, a greater in the promised weapons (the question is what kind of weapons) and training. For instance, Bangladesh offered training, Turkey offered weapons and training, and only Kuwait and Saud. Arabia have given money so far. The Muslim side therefore thinks that the value of the program covers only 40 percent of needs (it is unclear whose needs they referred to), which says a lot about the appetites that the Americans will be ready to satisfy in the strictly controlled process of armament. The initial training, which has already started, will mostly take place in Turkey. The first reason is that the Turkish armed forces are most appropriate for such a training—their army is strictly secularized, Islamism is separated from the army, and that concept is raised almost to the level of ideology. That makes Turkey more appropriate for the training of Bosnian soldiers than certain other Islamic countries where Islamic fundamentalism has prevailed, especially among officers of lower ranks (Algeria, Egypt), or where armies are organized on the basis of tribal loyalty (Jordan, Morocco). Another important element is that the promised equipment is the same as that used by the Turkish army (tanks, helicopters, pieces of artillery), so the training is being done in Turkey. It is interesting that the supervisor of the training is the Turkish General Cevik Bir, the commander of UN forces in the disastrous operation in Somalia.

Old Tanks

A delivery of 45 M-48 tanks is supposed to be the main assault weapons, and those are the oldest tanks in the U.S. Army reserves. Several versions were made, and the only good one—equipped with a 105-mm gun (labeled M 68)—is the most recent, called M-48A5. It is very important whether the delivery will be followed by a delivery of smaller-caliber ammunition with improved penetration features. Other models, equipped with 90-mm guns, are actually inferior to the Russian T-55 tanks—the most numerous tank in every army in the region of the former Yugoslavia.

By the end of the eighties, those tanks had been withdrawn even from the U.S. National Guard. One of the possible disadvantages of the M-48 tank—and all western tanks—is its weight (47 metric tons as opposed to 37 metric tons that the T-55 tanks weigh), unsuitable for bad roads and local bridges in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The tank is also relatively slow: Its maximum speed is 48 km per hour. The M-113 armored personnel carriers (about 80 of these) also long ago became outdated in their construction, especially because of their inferior armament: a single, heavy 12.7-mm machine gun. Besides, the infantry soldiers transported cannot open fire, as there are no apertures in the body of the carrier. Those carriers are usually given as military help to the Third World countries, and the new Lebanese army received a great number of these after the war.

Helicopters, the Better Part of the Offer

The most interesting part of the offer are the 15 helicopters—some of which are AH-1 "Cobra" assault helicopters. In this case, as with the tanks, combat features mostly depend on the version. In this case, the most probable version is the AH-1F or S—both of those having the TOW systems for launching armor-piercing missiles. Each of those helicopters in its best version can carry eight missiles with range of efficacy up to 4,000 meters, as well as two containers with 19 68-mm nonguided missile heads each. The nose of the helicopter contains a rotating three-barrel 20-mm gun.

Those helicopters may—but not necessarily—come with equipment for night-time action, like the helicopters delivered to Pakistan, Israel, and South Korea. The AH-1 "Cobra" can also carry the AN/ALO-144 system for impeding self-guided heads on the portable antiaircraft systems Strela 2, Strela 10, and SA-16 "Igla" used by the Serbian forces. UH-1 Huey transport helicopters used to be "the beast of burden" of the U.S. Army in the Vietnam war, but those are out of date now. Compared with the Russian MI-8 transport helicopters, already used by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO [Croatian Defense Council], the UH-1 has a 50 percent smaller capacity (14 persons instead of 28, and 1,759 kilograms of useful load instead of 4,000 metric tons).

Another disadvantage of the U.S. helicopters is that the pilots who flew Russian helicopters need a retraining of at least six months. In the case of assault helicopters with more complicated systems, pilots might take two years to achieve the optimum level of training. Another problem will be maintenance—for instance, the TOW missiles, being an older generation of armor-piercing missiles, need a periodical check, which requires special instruments.

Artillery Weapons

If we follow that logic, we can easily conclude that 155-mm howitzers, type M-114, will be delivered as main artillery weapons. Those are very reliable weapons

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

that have—in updated versions—remained a part of the armament of many armies, even of NATO-members (Italy, France, Greece, Netherlands). The former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] used to have those pieces of artillery, producing them under license in the Novi Travnik factory, under the name M-65, and Bosnia-Herzegovina already has the qualified repair personnel. A number of older types of 105-mm howitzers will come along.

The delivery of 50,000 M-16 guns can hardly be justified as logical or economical, as the ammunition for those guns (5.56 caliber) is different from those that the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO have used. Besides, earlier versions of that machine gun have proved much more difficult for maintenance under war conditions (mud, dirt, sand) and less reliable than the Russian AK-47 gun, the usual infantry weapon in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The U.S. soldiers in Vietnam even threw their M-16's away and took AK-47's from fallen Vietnamese soldiers.

We must constantly bear in mind that the western weapons, especially state-of-the-art ones, are not always appropriate for all countries. For instance, after the peace agreement was signed in Camp David, Egypt purchased a great number of the U.S. F-4 Phantom aircraft. The Egyptian mechanics eventually proved incapable of maintaining these aircraft properly, and the rate of malfunction exceeded 90 percent. The right question to ask is how many spare parts come with the weapons, what level of maintenance comes along, and how dependent all that makes Bosnia-Herzegovina on the provider of those weapons. In other words, the country that gives the weapons can affect the combat-readiness of the country whose weapons have all come from a single source. Therefore, it can also affect future political options.

B-H: Serbs Order Finnish Forensic Team To Stop Work

AU0507111196 Paris AFP in English 1009 GMT 5 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, July 5 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb police have ordered a Finnish forensic team recovering the remains of Moslems killed near the fallen enclave of Srebrenica to stop work, a UN official said Friday.

The official said the Bosnian Serb police sent a letter stating that the 20-strong team working to retrieve the badly decomposing bodies from a hill side in eastern Bosnia should cease work as they had "no authorisation."

"At 10.00 a.m. (0800 GMT) this morning, the UN recieved a letter from the Zvornik (Bosnian Serb) police saying that the Finnish team must stop work because they have no authorisation," Andrea Angelli, a UN spokesman said here.

The work, which Angelli said had been due to start work early Friday, is being financed by the Finnish and Dutch governments. Around 100 corpses have lain at the site, Kravice, for almost a year. They were gunned down fleeing Bosnian Serb forces who overran the enclave last July.

UN Special Rapporteur, Elizabeth Rehn, ordered the bodies to be recovered after visiting the site last year. The US state department believes at least 3000 Moslems were killed by the Serbs when they seized the former UN safe area.

On Sunday, investigators fromt he International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia are also to start digging up a mass grave in the Srebrenica region.

The exhumation, which aims to establish the date and cause of the victims' death and their identity, is the first of a series in Bosnia and Croatia which will take approximately three months to complete, the tribunal said in a statement.

B-H: Croat Mayor Discusses Results of Mostar Election

AU0407161996 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 3 Jul 96 p 7

[Interview with Mijo Brajkovic, mayor of western Mostar and leader of the Croatian Democratic Union list in the Mostar elections, by Milan Sutalo in Mostar; date not given: "Elections Confirmed Dayton"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The elections in Mostar have been carried out, and in an even better atmosphere than expected. On Monday, in the late afternoon, the preliminary and unofficial results for the City Council were announced, and they showed that HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] and the SDA [Party of Democratic Action], the leading parties of the Croatian and Muslim nations, almost shared the votes of the electorate. The Croat side supported the Mostar elections from the very beginning. Therefore, at the beginning of our interview, we asked Mijo Brajkovic, the mayor of western Mostar, whether he was satisfied with the fact that the elections have taken place, and whether he was satisfied with the election results.

[Brajkovic] The most important thing is that the elections were carried out in peace. The Croats were dignified in these elections, unlike the way in which reports

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

in Europe and the world depicted the Croatian people in western Mostar as criminals. Second, with these elections, the Dayton agreement has been verified in Mostar for the first time, and the Croat side has confirmed three majority municipalities in the town, by which the national, cultural, and religious identity of the Croats is preserved. That will reflect upon the total position of Croatian national body in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So, that is the most important thing. At the level of the town, the Croat and Muslim representatives, through the town assembly, will make decisions together on questions important for the whole town, and those are questions regarding the infrastructure.

Disputable Vote Abroad

[Sutalo] There were objections from both the Croat and Muslim sides that not everyone who had the right to vote was on the electoral rolls. Can those omissions put into question the validity of the elections, and who is responsible for those omissions?

[Brajkovic] The European Union is responsible for those omissions. Many people complained that they were not on the electoral rolls and that they had the right to vote. That irritated them, particularly those who travelled a great distance to vote. On the other hand, we did not have a precise insight into the voting abroad. There were some observers, but we had no real insight. Our suspicions regarding the regularity of the elections abroad are strengthened by the fact that 135,000 voting papers were printed, while just over 99,000 persons with a right to vote had been registered. There is also the fact that the HDZ won the greatest number of votes in the town, and that it was precisely the votes from abroad that created the slight lead for the SDA.

[Sutalo] Does that mean that the Croat side will raise the question of the regularity of elections?

[Brajkovic] I do not know that yet. We shall see when we get all the reports and all the data.

Politically Dead

[Sutalo] What was your opinion of the message that Mostar Mufti Efendi Smajkic sent to the Mostar Muslims on the eve of the elections, in which he invited them to go into the fatal battle to breaking neofascism and in which he talked about fulfilling Allah's wishes and so forth?

[Brajkovic] That message speaks more of the person who sent it, than of those to whom it was sent. This nation knows what it is, who it is, and what it wants, and it has shown that. We should not pay to much attention to such statements.

[Sutalo] In these elections, the SDA tried, by using some Croats, like Musa, Doko, and Gagro, to disturb the parity relationship between the two nations—16 Muslim and 16 Croat representatives—in the town assembly, of course to the advantage of the Muslims and at the expense of the Croatian nation. Can such attempts to put the Croats in a minority in Mostar succeed, regardless of the results of the elections?

[Brajkovic] It is true that the SDA believed that these people would tip the scales in their favor, however, this, as we call it, "Yugoslav list" won only a symbolic number of votes. The people have said loud and clear that they did not want a new Yugoslavia in Mostar. The election results have shown that this strategy failed and that the people you mention can be considered politically dead.

Economic Strengthening

[Sutalo] According to the statutes of the town of Mostar, municipalities can join each other and thus create new communities. Will the municipalities with Croatian majorities merge once the municipal authorities, in line with the election results, have been constituted?

[Brajkovic] As you said yourself, the statutes of Mostar allow the possibility for municipalities to merge, and we will use that possibility. As soon as these three municipalities with Croatian majorities are established and their borders are established, we will unite them and create one common municipal council. Thus we will accomplish what we wanted, what we fought for, and what we won. We will create a union of the Croatian people in Mostar and, when we achieve that, then we will try to gain economic strength in the best way we can.

New EU Role

[Sutalo] When can we expect the constituting of the municipal and city councils according to the results of the elections, and what will be the mandate of the EU Administration in Mostar afterwards?

[Brajkovic] As far as the EU is concerned, it is not for us to decide on that. That mandate will most probably be prolonged for another six months, but under new conditions. Their role will be advisory, and the most important task will probably be the reconstruction of economy and the continuation of the reconstruction of the infrastructure in the town.

As far as the constitution of the municipal and the city councils is concerned, it will happen upon the expiry of the legal term envisaged for complaints, when it will have been determined that the elections can be considered regular. After that, one should determine

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

how many seats each of the parties will get in the municipal assemblies and in the city assembly, and so on. So, one will have to wait a while.

[Sutalo] What can we expect after these elections in Mostar? Will things move forward easier and faster?

[Brajkovic] It depends a lot upon what will happen with the EU Administration. If its mandate is prolonged, and if it raises new funds, then it should work harder upon some common projects in the town. We have a number of unsolved problems—the infrastructure, the economy, unemployment. We should dedicate our efforts to that, and solve precisely these problems. Because, we have achieved the most important thing. That is the verification of what we have fought for, for what so many young people have laid down their lives.

[Box, p 7]

Croats Have Achieved Their Goal

[Sutalo] The Muslim media stated that the Mostar elections were "the crucial battle for a united Mostar." Is that not a manipulation with the electorate, because the organization of Mostar was determined by the Dayton agreement?

[Brajkovic] Of course it is a manipulation. These elections only verified the Dayton agreement, and it was the Croat side that suggested that the town of Mostar should consist of two or more municipalities with Croat or Muslim majorities. It was accepted in Dayton as the only realistic solution, which has been verified by these elections. So, the Croats have realized their goal.

B-H: Official Views Having To Repeat Mostar Elections

LD0307222396 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 3 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A meeting of the Mostar City Electoral Commission ended a short while ago. Our correspondents say that there are no final results of the elections in Mostar.

The correspondents report that voting in polling stations in Bonn is in dispute. A special commission of the Mostar City Electoral Commission there has established irregularities involving 26 ballot papers. The conclusion from the meeting is that a final decision will be made by the ombudsmen of the Federation. We have just received a statement by Rejuf Zaimovic, chairman of the City Electoral Commission:

[Begin Zaimovic recording] Further procedures cannot be performed, which means there will be no final decision—a decision adopted following a 4:3 vote. By four votes to three the elections in Bonn have been annulled. In other words, there was outvoting now and when we approved the electoral registers [as heard].

It is my view that if we annul the elections in Bonn—this decision is not final, the ombudsmen will decide, all the parties will get a decision by the ombudsmen—the elections in Mostar and elsewhere ought to be annulled, because the polling stations in Bonn were part of the elections for the whole city of Mostar, involving the whole electorate of Mostar. [passage omitted]

However, if the elections are annulled in Bonn, I have to say that they ought to be repeated everywhere, in all places. [end recording]

B-H: EU Postpones Announcement of Mostar Election Results

AU0407173696 Paris AFP in English 1723 GMT 4 Jul 96

[Report by Alexandra Haramina]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, July 4 (AFP)—Final results for the elections in the Bosnian city of Mostar will not be announced until Friday [5 July] at the earliest after a small group of votes was ruled invalid, the EU said Thursday.

The city's electoral commission said Wednesday that the voting by refugees in Bonn, one of four European capitals where Mostar refugees were able to vote, was invalid since more ballot papers had been found than voters.

"Yesterday's decision has annulled the results of the elections in Bonn, which must be repeated in conformity with the electoral rules," electoral commission secretary Vjekoslav Lovric told local Bosnian Croat radio Thursday.

The parties have 48 hours to appeal the decision. The EU, which administers Mostar and which organised the polls, said that it was up to EU ombudsman Constantin Zepos to decide about any reruns.

"He will take the final decision," the EU press office here told AFP Thursday.

The row over the voting in Bonn has prevented the publication of results. An EU spokesman said that they would not now be published until Friday at the earliest.

The row follows a protest lodged by the main Bosnian Croat party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), on Wednesday over the conduct of the elections in Bonn, Bern and Oslo. The fourth foreign capital where Mostar refugees voted was Stockholm.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

According to preliminary unofficial results published Monday, the mainly-Moslem List for a United Mostar, headed by Moslem mayor of east Mostar, Safet Orucevic, was heavily in the lead in Bonn.

Sunday's municipal elections were the first postwar polls in Bosnia and were intended to elect unified city authorities for Mostar which is split between Moslems in the east and Croats in the west.

The two communities fought for 11 months in 1993 and 1994.

Monday's preliminary results showed a general vote in favour of the status quo, with the HDZ heavily in the lead in the west and the List for a United Mostar leading in the east.

EU police spokesman Howard Fox told AFP Thursday that the NATO-led Implementation Force had wound down its security presence on the streets of Mostar. During the polls, tanks were deployed on many streets and at strategic points.

"We've already returned to normal. It was a gradual wind-down," he said.

Describing the situation as "quiet", he said that IFOR [Implementation Force] were nonetheless on call if necessary.

The EU had asked IFOR to provide security for the elections and 2,500 troops were put at the disposal of the EU. IFOR said the polls passed without major incident.

B-H: Daily on Implications of Mostar Elections for Bosnia

AU0307152896 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian 3 Jul 96 p 1

[Commentary by Ibrahim Prohic: "Mostar"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Is Mostar where it was before the elections? To what extent could Bosnia-Herzegovina see itself in the elections of the wounded town on the Neretva River? To what extent are the citizens of Mostar closer to Mostar itself? To what extent is the solution for Sarajevo connected to the solution in Mostar? The list of such questions is long, but they all have one thing in common: Each can be given contradictory answers, with all answers being equally realistic. The situation is such that optimists and pessimists alike seem like realists. Those who support the division of the town, as well as of Bosnia-Herzegovina, say "the clarification of the situation between the Muslims and the Croats" must be ascertained on the basis of the election results. Those on the other side interpret this as a desire for a united town. At this moment, it is not easy to see the gap at its clearest, which is why it is wise to wait and see how the situation develops. All the approaches and all the players remain in the game. Do they have the same chances they had before the elections?

Following the Mostar overture, the basic emotion of citizens and politicians, both local and foreign, is satisfaction. Ambassador Steiner is even enthusiastic. Two years of hard work no longer seems like wasted time. Naturally, if one wants to be critical, one can always find something in the demonstrated shortcomings, primarily in the fact that some voters who arrived from abroad did not find their names on the voter lists. Setting their subjective experience aside, the harm done is not so great that it would change the relation between the political forces.

What is the basis for dissatisfaction? Mostar was the theme of the day in the best possible way, the center of interest for the citizens of Mostar, for Bosnians, and for all of Europe. A lasting asset needs to be drawn from this. Moreover, the elections have shown that this country does not need a protectorate (such ideas existed until a few days ago) but that the terrorists and the usurpers of the citizens' political will need to be removed from the scene. Instead of a teaching a lesson in democracy and doubting whether Bosnia-Herzegovina is ready for civil solutions, it would be sufficient to establish conditions under which the citizens could freely express their political will. Here are a few more gains: The multinational List for United Mostar received a majority of the votes. This makes Mile Puljic's statement, that is, the answer to "What is a multiethnic town?" highly cynical. The number of those in western Mostar who did not vote for the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] is not negligible. The United List and Jule Musa survived the pressure they were under when going to the elections, although they still have tough times ahead. It is important that a third path also exists. The elections passed without incident. They were not democratic, but they were civilized, and in the end, the citizens of Mostar were very close to being a city, even if it was only for a day.

In the end, it seems that it would be difficult if not impossible for Mostar to return to the spiritual state where lynching of an EU administrator would have been possible. If so, then after Mostar, even Bosnia-Herzegovina stands a chance.

B-H: Significance of Mostar Elections Highlighted

AU0507120496 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 2 Jul 96 p 1

[Commentary by Ivan Sabic: "Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The European Administration in Mostar can finally lie back and relax. The elections

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

for local authorities, the real purpose of which was to mark the end of the administration's term, were finally held—after being postponed once and discussed many times. The attention paid by the leading networks in the world and the list of persons who came to Mostar on the last day of June show how important that event is considered to have been.

The atmosphere of the elections is best described by the statements of certain guests, who usually do not hesitate to accuse the "natives" for each and every failure to adhere to the imposed rules. The deputy high commissioner of the international community for civilian matters in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Michael Steiner, said it was a "model of well and profesionally prepared and organized elections".

However, we cannot tell whether European administrator Ricardo Perez Casado would have formulated his statement as he did—"when it comes to incidents, they are not worth mentioning"—had the Serb voters, having come from Belgrade, been attacked on the western (Croatian) instead of on the eastern (Muslim) side of Neretva. Still, that is just a part of the usual attitude of European representatives, who judge incidents not only by how difficult they are, but also by who provoked them.

However, the most important fact is that the western European Police with the help of IFOR [Implementation Force] troops had almost no work at all to do, despite the extremely complicated organization of the elections, which included the transport of voters from the Muslim part of town to the Croat part and vice versa.

As the recent elections in Mostar are universally considered to be an experiment for the September elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the bodies of Bosnian, entity, and canton authorities will be elected, the failure of the Mostar elections would undoubtedly have weakened the resoluteness of the international community to stick to the terms dictated by the Dayton agreement. Having that in mind, and admitting that breaking the terms agreed to in Dayton would be the beginning of the end of the peace agreement, we realize that—regardless of the results of individual lists—an important job has been done.

B-H: Markovic Justifies Herzeg-Bosnia Government

AU0507100396 Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 1 Jul 96 pp 26-27

[Interview with Pero Markovic, "president of the government of the Croat republic of Herzeg-Bosnia" and vice prefect of Herzegovina-Neretva County, by Miljenko Karacic; place and date not given: "Smaller Government Is Closer to Dayton"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The most interesting person in Mostar these days is not somebody who has to do with the elections. It is Pero Markovic, recently appointed head of the government of the Croat republic of Herzeg-Bosnia. The decision to reconstruct the government of Herzeg-Bosnia was fiercely criticized in the media, both in Bosnia-Herzegovina and abroad. We asked the first man of the Herzeg-Bosnia government about the meaning and background of that decision, as well as why the public was informed about it in the way it was, and about the results of the decision.

[Karacic] How did you take the controversial decision that a great part of the world is currently occupied with putting immense pressure both on the Croat officials in Bosnia-Herzegovina and on the Republic of Croatia?

[Markovic] We have to look back a little. After agreements were signed in Dayton and Washington, the leadership of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union] of Bosnia-Herzegovina established the program necessary for the Croat republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and all other institutions of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina to be transformed according to the Dayton principles and the way of life in these regions. We might consider the Dayton Agreement a set of regulations. Reality negates them sometimes, but certain issues in the agreement are given within the frame that we have to live in. The security and organization of life here must be taken care of until federal institutions and federal units—counties—are established. There were several options for the transformation of authority.

[Karacic] How did you arrive at the option that was adopted in the session of the Presidential Council?

[Markovic] The leadership of the Bosnian HDZ appointed a working group that made a model of the Government of Herzeg-Bosnia as a transitional form for the period before federal and regional authorities are established. The model was chosen on the grounds of experience in the Croat community of Herzeg-Bosnia during 18 months of its existence. The Croatian community of Herzeg-Bosnia used to have five ministries or departments, and our new model has six (Interior, Defense, Justice and Administration, Economy, and Public Services). Other institutions in the Government will also be active—with reduced personnel, of course. The legal form of the model was made by a group led by two lawyers: Barisa Colak and the secretary of the government, Miroslav Dzidic. Changes were also made in the Government Law and Ministries Law—we have six ministries now instead of the previous 14.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Karacic] However, the communique provoked the media. It gave the impression that the government of Herzeg-Bosnia was reinforced. Why did that happen?

[Markovic] I do not know how it happened, but one important sentence, the sentence that said that the rationalization of the government supports the Dayton Agreement in the period before the establishment of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and counties, was left out. That critical sentence was left out—and those who have other goals in the implementation of Dayton Agreement jumped at the opportunity. Everything that followed, we might say, was the result of our lack of caution and our federal partners' over conspicuous presentation of the reconstruction of the government. Anyway, everybody knows that the government had never stopped functioning. We have to give the retired their pensions, and doctors and teachers their salaries.

[Karacic] How do you justify the existence of ministries of Herzeg-Bosnia in the light of the fact that there are federal ministries?

[Markovic] I wonder if it is good to dismiss the Ministry of Defense of Herzeg-Bosnia when we still do not have the Federal Defense Law. Can we talk about the Ministry of Internal Affairs when it is just a county category? According to Washington and Dayton, only Interpol and certain joint services with a hundred cadres can be active in the federal ministry. Federal police are not a constitutional category. That is a nonexistent category made up to link our forces to bring about the implementation of the peace agreement. In order to survive here, we had to keep the duties that we have kept through corresponding ministries. On the other hand, the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina still exists, with eight ministries, although it was revoked two months ago. There is no Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina for us—there is just Bosnia-Herzegovina as determined in Dayton.

[Karacic] What do the activities of the government of Herzeg-Bosnia mean for the transitional period?

[Markovic] The existing model of power prevents us from falling into total destruction of our life here—if we are destroyed, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina will not need us. Every party has to have something to offer in that partnership. If we want to be together, we must have a characteristic national, cultural, and religious format. There is no point in the Federation consisting of two weak partners. Accordingly, that is another context that our government should be perceived in.

[Karacic] Why are the reactions on the reconstruction of the government happening right now? The decision was announced in the previous session of the Presidential Council, and nobody commented.

[Markovic] That is a good question. They picked the right time to put pressure on the Croat side in order to conceal the failure to adopt the Defense Law. The Muslim side signed the agreement on the adoption of the Defense Law in Dayton, but now they are persistently avoiding to pass the law in the Constituent Assembly. They want to rewrite the law so that it favors the unitarian Bosnia-Herzegovina. We cannot accept things that were not signed. The HVO [Croatian Defense Council] is a unique sign of our sovereignty, and that will be the dress we will wear in the Federation. Every side wants to come to the future conference on the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina dressed in their best.

[Karacic] Ejup Ganic, the vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, has opened the question of pressing charges against Bosnian Foreign Minister Jadranko Prlic for not informing the friends of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina about the peace project being undermined by the reconstruction of the Government of Herzeg-Bosnia. Representatives have also demanded the resignation of the president and vice president of the Federation. What is your comment?

[Markovic] That is really strange. Mr. Prlic had been dismissed from all his duties in the Croat republic of Herzeg-Bosnia by our previous decision. However, he is always pointed out as being a Croat in an important position. That shows that they actually care about the republic, not the Federation. Their vision of Bosnia-Herzegovina is the Federation with the reintegrated Croat part. I would not like to talk about their intentions concerning the Serb Republic now. I will leave that issue for some other time. By sacrificing Ganic, they actually want to get rid of Zubak, and consequently the entire project of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They also want to accuse the other side, the Croat side in this case, of having done that.

[Karacic] One gets the impression that the Muslims cover their steps in the obstruction of the Federation project very well, and make a fuss out of every trifle on the Croat part. Would you agree?

[Markovic] Yes. Although the Washington Agreement regulates the foundation of municipalities with the Croat majority in counties with Muslim majority and vice versa, nothing has been done about that. Nobody mentions that—and the request of the Croat community of Usora, for instance, is waiting. Federation police have been founded. Although that is not provided by the Constitution, nobody mentions that, either. On the other hand, we are not cautious enough about our statements.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

nor loud enough about the truth, and we are often disadvantaged because of that.

[Karacic] Another thing that nobody mentions is that you were recently taken into custody in the public security station in eastern Mostar. Were you really arrested?

[Markovic] Yes, that is true. On 7 June, a little before 8:00, a great inconvenience happened to me on my way to work. I was stopped by the Muslim police, who wanted to check my documents. They made me and the driver get out of the car. They found our weapons for personal protection, for which we had all the necessary papers. However, they said that those papers had not been drawn up by the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that we were ustashas, and that they were the law on that side. We were taken to the police station in eastern Mostar—they call it State Security Service—under threat of arms. They kept us there for more than 30 minutes, until they checked our documents. They suggested I should take bodyguards when passing through the area under their control. I told them that I was vice prefect, and if I had to walk around my county with bodyguards, everybody had to be somebody's bodyguard. I informed Mr. Zubak, president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, about that incident, as well as Michael Steiner, the international community's [deputy] high representative for the implementation of the Peace Agreement. However, our federation partners keep on talking about freedom of movement.

[Karacic] The government of Herzeg-Bosnia has many tasks in the transitional period. One of those is the elections in September. What will be the approach to those tasks?

[Markovic] We want the elections. Our task as government is, first, to ensure security in the elections. Second, elections cost money. Third, we have to see to it that voters can come to the polls freely. We also have to comply with the enormous requirements of the Provisional Election Committee. At the same time, the government is doing its best to improve the living standard of people in these regions. About 29,000 are unemployed and looking for work. Our pensioners receive 210 kuna per month on average. That is insufficient, but such are our possibilities at the moment. Approximately 100,000 salaries—including those pensions—are paid from the budget. That is a respectable number. Our political goal is the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and we must do our best to improve our position in the establishment of the Federation in the upcoming elections.

[Karacic] The number of ministries in the Government of Herzeg-Bosnia was reduced from 14 to six in the reconstruction. What will happen with the personnel and equipment of the dismissed ministries?

[Markovic] As I have stressed, we are talking about the gradual transition of capacities from the bodies of the Croat republic of Herzeg-Bosnia to those of the Federation and counties. Some of those cadres will be employed in federation institutions, some in counties. The issue of property will be solved in the same way. We will first take care of the accommodation for the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry of Transport and Communications. The permanent solution for four federal ministries will be found in the central administrative zone of Mostar. Of course, we will have to find accommodation for county institutions in the same area.

B-H: Recent 'Fierce' Bosniak-Croatian Border Clashes

AU0507104296 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 5 Jul 96 p 5

[Article by M. Djuric: "The 5th Corps Decimated Members of the 'Gromovi' Brigade"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At "Suva Medja," the border between the former Republic of Serb Krajina, now Croatia and the [illegible]in Krajina, in the Dvor na Uni area, fierce clashes recently broke out between the border units of the Muslim army, that is, the 5th Muslim Corps, and the Croatian Army, VESTI has learned from sources close to the military leadership of the Croatian Army.

According to these sources, relying on an agreement previously reached with the military leadership of the Muslim army, the Croatian Army had scaled down the control of the border toward the Cazin Krajina to the minimum. Owing to the length of the border and the configuration of the terrain, the Croats were guarding the border by carrying out occasional checks. The Muslims did not adhere to the agreement, and used the absence of the Croatian Army on the border for frequent incursions into the territory of the former Krajina, that is Croatia, where they felled trees and plundered nearby villages. Recently a clash broke out between a Croatian Army patrol and members of the 5th Corps, resulting in some casualties. The Croatian military leadership immediately sent reinforcements from Sisak to the "Suva Medja." The soldiers that were sent there were members of the famous "Gromovi" Brigade. This cost them their lives at Culum Kosa. In the fierce fighting several men were killed and wounded. The Muslims pushed them quite far from the border. On the same day there was also a clash in the Socanica and Kotaran area. The Muslims were more successful there, too.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Since then, the shooting can be heard on the "Suva Medja" every day.

B-H: Parties React to OSCE Election Rules

96BA0357A

[FBIS Report] Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian) in Serbo-Croatian, in the last days of April 1996, published a number of articles describing the initial reaction of various local parties to the rules established by the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] for this year's elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Article-specific information is provided in parentheses after the summary of each article.

Party of Democratic Action, Stolac

The Executive Committee of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] in Stolac issued a public protest saying that one provision of the OSCE rules allows displaced persons to vote in their current location. This is tantamount to "legitimizing ethnic cleansing, genocide and apartheid," and promotes the trend of creating a greater Serbia and greater Croatia. The election rules are further proof of the international community's disregard for Bosniak interests in Herzegovina, where displaced persons are prevented from returning home, the UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] refuses to act against human rights abuses, and mediator Christian Schwartz-Schilling consistently "prefers the Croat side." (Unattributed article: "Legalization of Division of Bosnia-Herzegovina"; 25 Apr 96 p 4)

Social Democratic Party

At a Tuzla press conference on 24 April, SDPBiH [Social Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina] officials Prof. Dr. Sead Avdic, Prof. Dr. Mustafa Sinanagic, and Prof. Edhem Muftic called the provisions of the election rules relating to voter registration "absolutely unacceptable." Allowing people to vote in their current locations "legitimizes the de facto situation established by the crimes of genocide and ethnic cleansing," which in turn promotes further ethnic divisions. The rules also fail to address the questions of media freedom and access to the media by all parties and candidates. (Article by Mato Bikic: "Rules Promote Division"; 25 Apr 96 p 6)

Civic Democratic Party

At a GDSBiH [Civic Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina] press conference in Zenica, party chairman Ibrahim Spahic said that the election rules are not good because they "sanction the existing balance of political forces, deepen ethnic divisions, and render the essential democratization of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the return of refugees impossible." (Unattributed article: "Sanctioning Ethnic Divisions"; 25 Apr 96 p 6)

Republican Party

At a Republican Party press conference on 25 April, Dr. Adnan Dizdar criticized the renunciation of the principle of "voting at the homestead," and thus voter registration on the basis of the 1991 census. He called for a system of documenting voters' original residences and allowing them to register and vote there. Dizdar also criticized the provisions relating to campaign financing, which serve to favor the ruling SDA and HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community]. He attributed the shortcomings in the election rules to the fact that only the SDA, HDZ, and representatives of the Serb entity sit on the Provisional Election Commission, saying that "if other political parties had been involved in the commission's work, the election rules certainly would have been better." (Article by S. Kasalo: "Displeasure with Election Rules"; 26 Apr 96 p 8]

Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina

The Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina issued a statement expressing its disappointment with the OSCE election rules. The rules promote the dismemberment of Bosnia-Herzegovina and fail to guarantee the right of people to return home. In particular, they leave open the possibility that hundreds of thousands of Serb refugees from Croatia will be allowed to vote in Bosnia-Herzegovina, thus affecting the structure of the electorate and the outcome of the voting. Under these rules, elections in areas where there are no guarantees of free political association will be a "farce." (Unattributed article: "Legalization of Dismemberment of Bosnia-Herzegovina"; 29 Apr 96 p 6)

B-H: Plavsic Comments on Her Talks With Milosevic

LD0407195596 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1838 GMT 4 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 4 Jul (SRNA)—Serb Vice President Biljana Plavsic has said that at today's meeting in Belgrade she informed President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic on [word indistinct] after she had taken up the powers of the president of the Serb Republic and was put forward as a candidate in the upcoming elections in the Serb Republic.

"All these events, after taking up the powers of the president [word indistinct] of the Main Committee of the Serb Democratic Party [SDS], attracted great interest from the public and the Serbian president himself, as he is one of the signatories of the Dayton Agreement," Professor Plavsic said in her statement for SRNA.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

She pointed out that "Milosevic was particularly interested in what direction the function of the president of the Serb Republic will take and to what degree all our institutions will be informed on the matter."

"I gave him guarantees that all the institutions, just as has been the case so far, were involved in helping with the implementation of the Dayton Agreement and that there should be no hold-ups in this respect," the vice president said.

Professor Plavsic added that "the SDS had many obligations regarding the upcoming elections, in particular because of occasional misunderstandings with the international community."

"These misunderstandings were, however, overcome at a lengthy meeting with Carl Bildt, the high representative of the international community, on 1 July," she said.

She pointed that "the SDS will take part in the upcoming elections on its own because it has its own program that differs considerably from the program of other parties."

"Any coalition between the SDS and the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic, or any other party is out of the question. The SDS is going into elections on its own and with its own program," Professor Plavsic stated categorically.

B-H: Karadzic Attempts To Take Over Bijeljina Media

AU0407151296 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1146 GMT 4 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Bijeljina, 4 Jul (BETA)—The Serb Republic (RS) authorities have ordered the local organization of the ruling Serb Democratic Party (SDS) in Bijeljina [Serb-held town on the border with Serbia] to arrange the closure of the SIM information house, which runs a radio station and publishes a paper, in that town.

Well informed sources close to the SDS in Bijeljina claim that SDS chairman Radovan Karadzic personally issued this order and that the local SDS committee should make the political decision on the SIM closure this evening.

The Bijeljina municipal authorities are the founders of SIM, so the editorial policy on the local radio and the newspaper has not been under the full control of the central authorities in Pale.

SIM has completed preparations for the opening of a TV studio and acquired the equipment, so Pale's intensified insistence on the closure of the information house and its takeover from the municipality by the central authorities is seen as linked to the television station.

The Bijeljina authorities have for months now been resisting Pale's attempts to take control of SIM, which is, by the way, open to other political parties and not only the SDS.

The decision to close down SIM and its takeover by the central authorities can only be made by the Bijeljina municipal authorities. The belief in the town is that there will be serious resistance to Pale's intentions.

B-H: Klickovic Describes Karadzic as 'Soul of the Serb Nation'

LD0407192296 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1806 GMT 4 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 4 Jul (SRNA)—Serb Prime Minister Gojko Klickovic today reiterated his earlier stand that the decision by Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic and of the Serb Democratic Party of the Serb Lands (SDSSZ), not to stand as candidate in the upcoming elections expressed his readiness to "be a victim in a political sense, in order that the Serb people here can realize their interests and goals."

In a statement for SRNA, Klickovic said that Karadzic was the "soul of the Serb nation," stressing that the "people of the Serb Republic followed him through all this and the Serb Republic will never be able to do without the name of President Karadzic." The people will, he said, do what their conscience tells them to do and they will take the final step toward creating a Serb state west of the Drina.

Commenting on threats by the State Department that the SDS will be taken out of the electoral race if it maintained "its links with Karadzic," the prime minister of the Serb Republic said that the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] had accepted the SDS list and that the Dayton Agreement differentiated between the state and party functions, so that there were no longer any barriers in that respect.

B-H: Djindjic Praises Karadzic Withdrawal From Election

LD0507132096 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1215 GMT 5 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 5 Jul (SRNA)—Zoran Djindjic, chairman of the Democratic Party, has said the decision by Radovan Karadzic, president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, not to stand as a candidate in the elections [on 14 September] is a statesmanlike gesture and implies the placing of national above personal interests.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

"We are certain that President Karadzic would win in the elections had he stood as a candidate," Djindjic said at a news conference in Belgrade, pointing out that the international community in the new circumstances ought to treat the [Bosnian] Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat federation equally. [passage omitted]

B-H: Karadzic's 'Forced' Withdrawal From Elections Viewed

LD0407213496 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 4 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] This will be written down in history books: Radovan Karadzic, the man who did the most for the creation of the state and for elections to be held at all, will not run as a candidate in the first multiparty elections in the Serb Republic. Although Karadzic's candidacy would no doubt be an expression of the Serb people's will, not only in the Serb Republic but also in Yugoslavia and in the diaspora all over the world, the main committee of the Serb Democratic Party—headed by Karadzic himself—decided not to put him forward as a candidate at his personal request. Remaining consistent in the service to his people and (?fully aware) of all possible consequences of unprecedented threats, pressures, and blackmail by international players, Karadzic proved by this move too that he does not care for power, but for the people's interests based on elementary justice.

Let us recall on this occasion: In peacetime and wartime the Serb people, under the leadership of President Karadzic, have never asked, and are not asking now for anything more than the God-given right of every nation in the world: the right to self-determination and a free life in one's own democratic state. Karadzic was and still is the most deserving champion of precisely that right. That will remain written in history books.

In the name of truth we must take note of one more point. After the forced withdrawal of Karadzic's candidacy, it became completely pointless to talk about democratic and free elections, an issue the OSCE, the organizer of the election, likes to brag about. It has become completely superfluous to believe in the principles that organization set. After all, what can we say about the principles the OSCE set out at its conference in Copenhagen in 1990 and which were included into the text of the Dayton agreement word by word? According to those principles, the will of the people must be the basis of the authorities' power, and the citizens' right to stand for any political and public position—individually or as representatives of political parties or organizations—must be respected without any discrimination. These principle seem to be valid for everyone except the Serbs.

To cite in this specific instance The Hague tribunal as a possible justification for the flagrant violation of these OSCE principles is completely groundless because that tribunal—as the most eminent world experts have shown—is not based on justice and law but on political interest. As for the forthcoming election, the only remaining question is how much more will threats and blackmail be used to limit their democratic character.

There have already been completely open threats to that effect. Speaking through Washington's mouth, the head of the OSCE mission in former Bosnia said that the OSCE would have to decide whether the Serb Democratic Party would be allowed to take part in the election at all if Radovan Karadzic remained at its helm. After that statement there is no doubt as to what kind of policy the world's power wielders pursue toward the Serb people.

It has become completely clear that the fabricated charges against Karadzic were not brought in order to exert pressure on him personally, but on the Serb people collectively because they fought for independence. Pressure would be the same even if the Serb people were led by someone else who advocated the same national policy.

In line with the folk saying that good may come from evil, the threats aimed at denying every nation's basic right—which is the right to a (?political nation)—have in a certain way helped the Serb people to decide who to vote for in the forthcoming elections. It is clear that they must vote for the orientation advocated by Karadzic, which will preserve and develop the national independence of the Serb people and the state autonomy of the Serb Republic. Anything other would lead the Serb people into a definitive historic defeat paramount to extinction.

B-H: Montenegrin 'Source' Claims Mladic 'Seriously Ill'

AU0507133896 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 5 Jul 96 p 3

[FONET report: "Ratko Mladic Seriously Ill?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica—General Ratko Mladic of the Army of the Serb Republic is very seriously ill. This was confirmed to MONTENA FAX by a source in the circle closest to Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic, citing information that only the Montenegrin president has. According to the same source, we are talking about repeated massive strokes that have seriously affected some of Gen. Mladic's vital functions, even his life, the agency reports.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Croatia: 'Sources' Claim Croatian Army To Storm Vukovar

AU0507075996 Belgrade DNEVNI TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 3 Jul 96 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Croatian Army Concentrating Powerful Forces on Border With Slavonija-Baranja District, Threatening To Storm Vukovar"]

[FBIS Translated Text] If the Serbs in the Slavonia-Baranja district continue to insist on special autonomy within the Republic of Croatia, the Croatian Army will with a few of its elite troops very quickly march into the Slavonia-Baranja district and carry out an "anschluss" similar to that of Adolf Hitler, who marched with his army into Vienna in 1938 and annexed Austria to Germany.

Yugoslav Army intelligence sources warn of this possibility, claiming that the Croatian Army is moving its powerful armored mechanized units from the region of Zupanja in the direction of Vinkovci and Osijek.

The troops are comprised of two elite brigades, the 3d and 7th Brigades, which following certain preparations are capable of marching into the Vukovar and Beli Manastir area in a matter of 24 hours. Our sources cite information that the Croatian Army carried out a partial mobilization of its reserve corps in the Split-Zadar region 15 days ago. More than 20,000 soldiers are currently stationed on the Crvena zemlja training ground near Glina. The mobilization and the repositioning of the Croatian Army elite troops toward the borders of the Slavonia-Baranja district at the time when all armies on the territories of the former Yugoslav republics are, pursuant to the Dayton accord, reducing their military potentials can be interpreted as a form of pressure on the Serbs to give up their political demands or to encourage their migration to the FRY, which has been happening over the past 20 days.

The Croatian state leadership, that is, Franjo Tudjman personally, reckons that the "anschluss" of the Slavonia-Baranja district would be greeted with a tacit approval—eventually it would all blow over—while Franjo Tudjman would definitely improve his shaken rating. Germany and the United States are probably familiar with this plan, our sources claim, and in this light we should view the Hague tribunal's threat to investigate General Cervenko and even Franjo Tudjman as a measure to prevent the Croatian troops from marching into Vukovar. Namely, Bill Clinton's administration believes that his electoral campaign does not need any additional complications that would deviate from the Dayton accord. However, this does not necessary mean that such an interpretation is sufficient for Tudjman, our sources in the Yugoslav Army say.

Croatia: Serb Association Claims 600 Serbs in Mass Graves

AU0307152596 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1213 GMT 3 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 3 July (BETA)—Boro Martinovic, head of the service for missing persons with the Crisis Staff of the former Republic of Serb Krajina, that is headquartered in Banja Luka, has stated today that the bodies of 600 Serb civilians are to be found in six mass graves in Croatia, who were killed during Operation Storm.

According to the service's data, most of the killed, predominantly elderly Serbs, were buried in the Glina cemetery, the Petrinja city cemetery, involving 141 Serb graves, the village of Nozici Kriz near Glina, where there are 79 Serb graves at the local cemetery, the village of Vanici near Dvor na Uni, involving 78 graves, the village of Novo Seliste near Petrinja involving 70 graves, and the village of Matijevici near Dvor where nine bodies are buried.

However, there are fears that the mass graves registered at the village of Zamlace near Dvor, the village of Strmen near Kostajnica, the village of Gvozdenjsko and along the road Cesta-Glina-Dvor, between Brezovo Polje and Gvozd, contain a far greater number of killed Serbs.

Those massacres were committed during the military operation Storm in Krajina, in which members of the Bihac-based 5th Corps of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina took part, along with the Croatian Army and police.

Croatia: UNTAES Says Croatian Amnesty Law Inadequate

LD0307164296 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1124 GMT 3 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Vukovar, 3 Jul (SRNA)—UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] is not satisfied with the Croatian judiciary's decision to exempt 811 Serbs from the amnesty law, Philip Arnold, UNTAES spokesman for the Serb region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem has said.

Speaking last night on UNTAES radio, broadcast from the studio of Serb Radio Vukovar, he said that the amnesty law, adopted by the Croatian Parliament on 17 June, should be more comprehensive.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

"Persons not covered by the law can be tried only under international law on war crimes," Arnold said, adding that "the amnesty law remains an open issue."

Croatia: Serb Official Criticizes Exclusions From Amnesty Law

AU0407154196 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 1 Jul 96

[Interview with Vojin Susa, "secretary of the Secretariat for Justice and Administration of the Executive Council of the Serb Province of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem," by Jovan Vlajkovic; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] In its Saturday issue, Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI published the list of names of all the Serbs against whom the Croatian Government has instituted court proceedings. It is stated that this is only a partial list of the Serbs to whom the abolition law does not apply. Our colleague Jovan Vlajkovic interviewed Mr. Vojin Susa, secretary of the Secretariat for Justice and Administration of the Executive Council of the Serb Province of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, about this list, a judicial and political farce of their lovely homeland.

[Vlajkovic] The media campaign conducted by the Republic of Croatia and aimed against the people of the province has acquired an additional element. The appearance of lists of unsuitable Serbs—first in the Croatian media, and then in the Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI—has disturbed the public here again. The selective Croatian amnesty of the Serbs has again been proved to be a politicization and discouragement of the return of the Serb refugees.

[Susa] What Croatia wants has been clear since the very beginning. With the selective amnesty law, pressure is put on the people of the Serb Province of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, and they are not sure whether to stay or leave—naturally, creating a situation that is the only one favorable to Croatians, which is that the people should leave this area.

In this context, that is, at a critical moment in this political game that has been going on for over a month now, a list appeared. Actually, it is part of a larger list that we have been gradually introduced to since 1991 through various forms of media promotion.

The list in itself does not deserve any particular comment. Unfortunately, I have skimmed through it, though I do not intend to study such lists, and I noticed that there are many people there who could not be condemned even for the most-common criminal act, let alone for war crimes, which are the only crimes that the amnesty does not cover.

As you know, the Croatians have omitted about 250 [word indistinct] criminal acts from this amnesty law. It follows that no one from this area will be granted amnesty—some will be told of the fact that they will not be granted amnesty, while others will, if they put themselves in such position, unfortunately only be told of this tragic fact by the Croatian authorities when the Croatian authorities have hold of them.

[Vlajkovic] With this kind of political maneuvering, the Government of the Republic of Croatia has jeopardized everything that has been achieved, through great efforts, in creating mutual trust and keeping peace. At the same time, the UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] task of implement its mandate as agreed and signed has not been made any easier.

[Susa] If, in the interest of some kind of peace—not just any peace, but real peace, peace whose characteristics are specified—you do allow yourself to lose, at a certain level of dignity, as we have, in relation to the Croats, it is still not appropriate to turn the other cheek. I think that we should stick to our principles in this; we must tell the UNTAES that we know what it is all about. Considering that they have many experts who are well aware of what an amnesty law should include and what the goal of what we are discussing today is, the UNTAES will have to take not our side but the objective side, or else no talks can be expected that would result in cooperation between our side and the Croatian side, which would benefit both, and, in that case, everyone will understand that the task of the UNTAES is in fact one-side and that it definitely wants to reintegrate this area into the territory of Croatia. This reintegration would be a grotesque one, as the land would be reintegrated, but the people would certainly not be.

[Vlajkovic] The main task of the UNTAES is to keep and secure equal rights for all those who are here and who want to stay here. This is why the UNTAES legal and other experts should make much more effort in order not only to stop but also to prevent any attempt aimed at people moving out of this area.

Croatia: Serb Secretariat Protests Croat Indictment of Policemen

AU0407150696 Beli Manastir Radio-Televizija Republike Srpske Krajine Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 1 Jul 96

[Text of announcement issued by the "Secretariat of the Interior of the Serb Province of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Regarding the publishing of the names of members of the police force from our province against whom criminal proceedings have been instituted in the Republic of Croatia because they allegedly committed criminal acts against humanity and international law, the Secretariat of the Interior [Sluzba javne bezbednosti] of the Serb Province of Eastern

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem has issued the following announcement:

On the territory of the Serb province, only the authorized officials of the provincial Secretariat of the Interior and its units are allowed to carry out measures and acts in accordance with the law and in the way proscribed by the law and other regulations.

With the goal of promptly protecting its members, it was earlier determined against which of our members proceedings had been instituted in the Republic of Croatia and for what criminal acts. The senior structures of the Secretariat of the Interior promptly pointed out to UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] representatives and other international institutions that the abolition law passed by the Parliament of the Republic of Croatia is not adequate and that it represents a direct obstacle to the implementation of the provisions included in UN Security Council Resolution 1037 and the general agreement.

Moreover, it needs to be pointed out that the analyses of the proceedings against certain members of the secretariat of interior—despite the fact that we did not have all the (?documents) at our disposal—have proved that a great number of the proceedings are based on false facts [as heard] and that the proceedings are show proceedings, corresponding to the Stalinist-Comintern purges and trials.

The main task of the Secretariat of the Interior, alone and as part of the transitional police force, is to take measures and acts against the perpetrators of criminal acts and other offences. It is therefore quite clear that its obligation is to carry out the tasks resulting from the provisions of the law on criminal proceedings and other regulations. However, the main starting point of a criminal proceedings is that no innocent person can be sentenced, but that the culprits must receive the punishment they deserve.

It is this that the activity of the secretariat will be aimed towards. From the legal point of view, the publishing of the list of alleged war criminals by the Republic of Croatia is not a legal act, but a political act. It is in fact the continuation of the psychological propaganda activity of the ruling Croatian bodies, its main goal being to create disturbance and tension both among the members of the secretariat and the citizens. The intention behind this act is to get a great number of Serbs, particularly distinguished persons and those holding public office, to leave this area. If they were, quite understandably, to leave the area, a great number of citizens would follow them, which would create another exodus and result in the achievement of Croatia's goals. Although, objectively, there are no real reasons for this to happen, [words indistinct] of the Serb people in the Serb province and Serbs in general.

All the members of the secretariat of the Serb province will continue to perform their work and (?join) the transitional police forces. With the goal of protecting the people, securing the property, and ensuring the personal safety of all the citizens, the operative and preventive activity will be intensified, as the keeping of stable public order will assure the international institutions, particularly the transitional administration, that the territory of the province should and must exist as a separate entity with a special status.

With this in mind, the members of the Secretariat of the Interior have agreed to make their contribution in the achievement of these goals within the transitional police forces, declaring that they have complete trust in the transitional administration and Mr. Klein.

Members of the police force and other authorized officials who, for whatever reason, cannot or do not want to stay in the area, will not be left to themselves, since the secretariat will—if for no other reason but solidarity—deal with their material status and other (?issues).

Croatia: Hadzic, Arkan Comment on List of 811 War Criminals

AU0407152296 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1430 GMT 1 Jul 96

[Unattributed report on statements by Goran Hadzic, "president of the Serb Province of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem," and Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan, "commander of the Serb Volunteer Guard"; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Correspondent] The list containing names of 811 rebels that Croatia has not covered by the amnesty law is a premeditated political move with the goal of causing confusion among the people of the Serb Province. This is what Goran Hadzic, president of the Serb Province of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, said in his comment on the list issued by the Croatian Ministry of Justice [words indistinct] are not recommended to wait for the Croatian authorities to return to the Croatian Danubian area.

[Hadzic] Croatian officials have, on several occasions, publicly expressed their dissatisfaction with the fact that the Serbs in the province have not been affected with the Knin syndrome and that they are stubbornly staying and surviving in their homes.

[Correspondent] Hadzic's name is also on the list of potential war criminals. He added:

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Hadzic] The Croatian authorities will, naturally, not frighten us with any of their lists, nor will the frequent nightly phone calls of the former neighbors from Croatia—whose only message at present is that we should not wait for them—make us change our minds. Our homes, our graves, and our tradition are here, and here is where we will stay.

The list is a farce, because it contains names of many people who did not take part in either political or military events. (?I think) that it will not be possible to conduct valid investigations against almost any of these 811 people, let alone pass sentences. If any war crimes did occur in the conflicts, their number is negligible, and this [word indistinct] list of suspects is ridiculous, to say the least.

[Correspondent] According to Hadzic, the Serb side will continue to insist that U.S. general and diplomat Jacques Klein, the transitional administrator, should work towards Croatia passing a serious amnesty law as soon as possible, a law will include not only the Serbs in the province, but also the Serbs from the Knin Krajina, regardless of where they have found temporary shelter.

[Hadzic] As for myself, I can only say that I would feel uncomfortable if my name were not among the names of my compatriots, even when they are Croatian lists of alleged war criminals. I have been with my people since the beginning of this story, and it is my duty to stay with them until the end.

[Correspondent] Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan, commander of the Serb Volunteer Guard, which was, until recently, stationed in Erdut, also commented on the list of 811 alleged Serb war criminals. He said:

[Raznjatovic] I would feel bad if my name were not on the list, which contains names of some exceptionally brave and honorable fighters for the sacred Serb goal. However, my list of Croatian war criminals in eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem is much longer. There are 3,211 of them; they were Ustashas who were killing Serb children.

Croatia: Serbs Protest Exclusion From Regional Talks

AU0407175196 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 3 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The provincial commissioner for refugees has filed protest with the special envoy of the UNHCR for former Yugoslavia, Soeren Jenssen Petersen, because they were not invited to the regional meeting with refugees [sentence as heard].

Commissioners and ministers for refugees and displaced persons of Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, and the Serb Republic have been invited to attend the meeting in Budapest tomorrow. The protest letter of the provincial commissioner for refugees and displaced persons says that there are 61,000 refugees and 12,000 displaced persons on the territory of the Serb province of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem, and the future of these people depends on the possibility of the provincial commissioner for refugees and displaced persons, Mr. Srbislav Mikic, talking and negotiating on their behalf.

The territory of our Serb province is under UN transitional administration, says the protest letter, adding that it is necessary that the provincial commissioner for refugees and displaced persons also attend the meeting, as he would best articulate the problems regarding this issue on the territory of the Serb province.

Croatia: Serb Radio Criticizes Exceptions to Amnesty Law

AU0407154896 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 1 Jul 96

[Commentary by Aleksandra Jaksic]

[FBIS Translated Text] The recently passed partial law on amnesty for the Serb people in the Serb Province of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem has caused many dilemmas, not only among the Serbs, but also among the international representatives taking part in establishing peace in this area. The Croatian Ministry of Justice has issued a list of 811 persons to whom the amnesty law does not apply. Most of these persons did not take part in any of the criminal acts Croatia is charging them with, and some of the people whose names are on the list have been dead for several years. Aleksandra Jaksic has a commentary on this.

[Jaksic] The creators of the incomplete amnesty law for the people of the Serb Province of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem have heard a may remarks and criticisms. The contents of the law seem to indicate that the law is aimed more towards further ethnic cleansing of the area than towards creating an atmosphere for the establishment of permanent peace and a reduction of the inter-ethnic hatred.

The Croatian authorities were advised to pass a general amnesty law, but they have been persistent in evading it. General Klein has recently stated that it would be best if the Croatian side were to publish the list of names not covered by the amnesty law in order for everyone to know where they stand. This statement was not published in the Croatian media, but, incidentally, on St. Vitus Day [28 June], all the Croatian daily papers published the [words indistinct] of the Croatian Ministry

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

of Justice containing the list of 811 names to whom the law does not relate.

The statement of the Ministry of Justice says that the list does not include those persons who committed criminal acts included in Article 3 of the law and continues to list the criminal acts that are not covered by the amnesty law. (?These) include the criminal acts of unlawful killing and wounding of enemy troops, the unlawful taking of objects from the killed and wounded on the frontline, the use of unpermitted combat equipment, the acknowledgment of capitulation and occupation, [word indistinct] and associating in enemy activity, threatening the territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia, threatening the independence of the Republic of Croatia, raids, sabotages, and so on.

On the basis of these exemptions, it is possible to arrest and prosecute any Serb found in the province who took part in the defense of their area in any way.

Moreover, with this act, Croatia has shown and confirmed that it is not concerned with its image in the international community, but rather that it still yields to the backward political forces who would best like to see as many Serbs as possible—who have lived on their land and in their houses for centuries—expelled from all the areas that the international community has recognized as the territory of the Republic of Croatia.

The responsibility for this development of events lies with the international community, primarily Europe and the United States.

Croatia: Financial Aid Linked to Reintegration of Serb Areas

LD0407200896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1854 GMT 4 Jul 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vukovar, July 4 (TANJUG)—Croatian Minister of Economy Davor Stern said in Vukovar Thursday that the reintegration of the Serb region of eastern Slavonia, Baranja and west Srem into the state of Croatia was a condition for firms from the region to obtain financial aid for boosting production.

At a news conference held after talks with the regional secretary for economy Borislav Jocic and directors of the biggest firms in the region, Stern said that "firms asking for aid from the Croatian Government will have to be registered beforehand in Zagreb, and that would automatically mean their reintegration into the economic system of Croatia."

He added that expert teams of the Institute of Economy in Zagreb have already worked our programs to reenergize the economic system of Croatia.

He added that the expert team of the Institute of Economy in Zagreb have already worked out a program for reanimating big firms in the region, but that the Croatian side was ready to work out new projects of rebuilding those firms.

Stern stressed that he was satisfied with the talks he held with businessmen from the region.

U.N. administrator Jacques Klein, who mediated the talks, assessed that business contacts between the two sides were important for development and the solution of problems of the region, and assessed that the economy of the region had a future, and that the talks were an introduction for creating the model of that future.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FYROM: Albanians Demonstrate for Tetovo University

LD0407184096 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1654 GMT 4 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje, 4 Jul (TANJUG)—About 10,000 Macedonian Albanians demonstrated this afternoon in the center of Tetovo in support of the instigators and leaders of the so-called Tetovo University, which the Skopje Government considers unconstitutional.

The rally was organized by a group of radical parliamentary and nonparliamentary opposition parties representing ethnic Albanians in FYROM [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] and their associations, in protest against the sentences passed on the creators of Tetovo's ethnically pure "university."

Citizens of Tetovo, as well as Skopje, Kicevo, Struga, Gostivar, Kumanovo, and even neighboring Albania and FRY (Albanians from the province of Kosovo-Metohija), took part in the demonstration.

The rally was held under the slogan "We are demanding protection" for the charged initiators of the parauniversity, including the self-styled "dean," Fadilj Sulejmani. The paraphernalia displayed at the meeting were complemented by Albanian flags and two fingers raised to signify V for victory. The rally opened to the tunes of the Albanian national anthem.

Sulejmani, chairman of the "university senate" Milijam Fejzi, Professors Musli Halimi, and Nevdzad Halili, and architect Arpen Rusi, according to the summons issued by the Tetovo municipal court, are supposed to report to the authorities on 22 July in order to serve the sentences which have been passed on them and which range from four months to one year.

The sentences that were passed on 19 June relate to the well-known case of the opening of an illegal university in the Tetovo suburb of Mala Recica on 17 February 1995, when one demonstrator was killed in an armed clash between police and ethnic Albanians, and about 60 people were seriously or slightly injured.

Speakers at the rally demanded the legalization of Tetovo University and its integration into the Macedonian education system, the release of all political prisoners, and general protection for, and an improvement in the status of, the Albanians in Macedonia.

Among many nationalist songs that echoed around the crowd of demostrators in Tetovo were those about Kosovo and Albania. Slogans and cries such as "Down with the government" and "Death or freedom" could also be heard.

Speakers claimed that all the conflicts so far between the police and the Albanians in FYROM were concocted by Kiro Gligorov.

It is interesting to note that the most influential Albanian party, the Party of Democratic Prosperity (PDP), which is included in Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski's government, called on its membership to take part in today's rally, while the party's leadership failed to turn up.

The PDP leadership gave its support to the demands voiced at the protest, referring to them as "positive for all Albanians."

Radical Albanian parties announced actions for the political destabilization of FYROM unless the persons responsible for the Tetovo University are charged.

FYROM: Almost 40,000 Albanians Attend Rally in Tetovo

AU0407201896 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 4 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] About 40,000 Albanians held a massive rally in Tetovo's main square today, protesting the imprisonment of Tetovo university leaders and activists. Our correspondent from Skopje Ibadete Hajrullahu has a report on the rally:

[Hajrullahu] We Demand Protection, Tetovo University Will Live as Long As We Will, Tetovo University is Our Revival, Rector: We Are With You—these were some of the slogans written in the placards held by the almost 40,000 citizens who gathered today in a mammoth rally in this Tetovo square.

The representatives of the protest organizers—Ramadan Sinani from the Writers' Association, Myqerem Merusi from the Women's League, Mendu Thaci, Rector Fadil Sulejmani, Iljaz Halimi, Nevzat Halili, etc.—spoke about the goals of the rally and the attempts of the current government to extinguish the work of the Albanian Tetovo university in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] by depriving its activists Rector Fadil Sulejmani, Milaim Fejziu, Nevzat Halili, and Arben Rusi of their freedom.

The rally once again reminded the people gathered there of the grave situation of Albanians in Macedonia in various periods, as well as of the frauds, the trumped-up trials, the unnecessary friction, the maltreatment, and the discrimination in various spheres, which has reached its culmination with the discrimination in the higher education of Albanians.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

The large number of citizens at the rally testified that Tetovo university, its rector, and his associates are strongly supported by Albanians in Macedonia.

The temple of knowledge is a fundamentalist issue for Albanians. There will be no turning back. Apart from the old forms of the Balkan political mentality, still not eradicated in these areas, the democratic world can in no way understand why the university rector has been deprived of his liberty. These were some points made by the participants at the rally.

Once again, this massive protest in Tetovo's center, which, as has been warned, will be held in other Albanian cities in Macedonia and Western centers and Washington, vehemently expressed the dissatisfaction of Albanians with the imprisonment of educational activists and their situation in general. The rally aimed to create a political crisis, perhaps even involving withdrawing from the state bodies.

An appeal was read today from the rostrum of the rally, which was sent to international institutions, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], the U.S. State Department, Amnesty International, and the UN General Assembly. The message from the rally, which was attended by a large number of reporters, was to make clear to the public at home and abroad the truth about the situation of Albanians in Macedonia and to create conditions for increasing the dialogue between the two sides for a just solution to the problems with which the Albanians are faced.

The rally ended without incident. OSCE and UNPREDEP [UN Preventive Deployment Force] observers were noticed. Public order employees were seen around, with the aim of maintaining order at the rally, although the organizers had engaged a large number of activists for this [purpose].

FYROM: Article Reflects on Impact of Kosovo Partition

AU0307115996 Skopje DNEVNIK in Macedonian 29 Jun 96 p 10

[Commentary by Slobodan Casule: "Cartographers Gush Forth Once Again"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Serbian-Albanian separation in Kosovo and in Serbia is not a local question. Even less is it exclusively Serbian, or exclusively Albanian. There is no doubt that it also affects Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and that it may define how long the Republic [of Macedonia] exists. This is even more so because SANU [Serbian Academy of Science and Arts], the mother and stepmother of the Greater Serbia Memorandum [written by former FRY president Dobrica Cosic and issued by SANU in 1986], has announced as much, while European cartographers are rushing to give this idea a face and a body. We must not forget that it was precisely a memorandum and a pack of confused cartographers that thrust the Balkans into its present Fifth War. As ever, the local vultures were and still represent the arms, the pretext, and normally, the sacrificial goat and nothing more.

It all has to do with harmonization, if such a thing is possible, harmonization and a definition of the Serbian and the Albanian question in the Balkans. In the understanding of both the Europeans and the Americans, these are the two crucial problems in the Balkans. So, following the same old fashioned train of thought that ended in the Berlin Congress, the definition of what is Serbian and what is Albanian should put an end to (the remaining) Balkan wars. Not because the division will be accurate—that will never satisfy either one side or the other—but because a quasi solution that will please Europe will be reached. The aim will be to disengage the Russians, but also the Americans; to separate the French from the British and both of them from the Germans, and to return the Italians.

Serbia has always been and will continue to be a factor in the Balkans, sometimes with a positive, other times with a negative prefix. The same was the case with the present Balkan war: First Serbia was a factor of war, and now it is a factor of peace. In the geographical and political strategy of the state's internal political structure, Serbia now has the second role and it will only be touched if it represents a direct obstacle to strategic goals. The Americans and the Russians have frequently confirmed this rule of imperial policy, in Latin America and Africa, in the Near and the Far East. Taking this into consideration, cartographers of different origin are gushing forth again and their rush is owed to the race toward the inevitable change in Serbia's prefix.

Some are trying to maintain control, others to gain it.

Albania was deliberately created in the European Imperial Kitchen. It did not happen spontaneously at all, or with the aim of accomplishing the ideas and goals of the first edition of the Prizren League. Europe deliberately made it incomplete as a tribal state in order to make it a European, and now an American, bridgehead for the Slav Balkans, which has always been exposed to suspicion because of deep Pan-Slavic feelings (read: Penetration of Russia, which is and remains an Imperial Power). It was also created for the sake of U.S. supervision over the European allies, who know nothing, but instigate wars in the Balkans. As if this were the only

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

small part of Europe in which the all-European Peace was not signed. Or, as if the European Union functions only in places where it cannot do otherwise, whereas in the Balkans, which is a true Twilight Zone, anything is possible!

The chemist and president of SANU, Aleksandar Despic, is a learned man. No matter how much some of the official Serbian engineers of the SPS (SKS) [Serbian Socialist Party (Serbian League of Communists)] soul dissociate from him, Despic is not a fool to talk about the demographic explosion and its political consequences—losing the state as a result of the invasion of Albanians—instead of talking about chemistry. He said that the Serbian nation must decide between Kosovo and Serbia. He is by no means being senile, although senility is a post-Yugoslav specialty, when he warns that Serbia can only be saved if it gives up Kosovo in time (read: Now!). Despic is skillfully and justifiably advocating separation between the Serbs and the Albanians! Conversely, if the property is not divided, with their explosive birthrate the Albanians will soon outnumber the Serbs and take over the whole of Serbia.

Neither Despic nor the cartographers, of which the Italians were the fastest, say what they mean by the proposed partition: Separation of Kosovo, followed by sovereignty for the Albanian part and a future referendum on joining the fatherland? Or, Kosovo a republic and a constituent part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia?

This is deliberate, for all the negotiating trump cards depend on the resolution of the next step in the Serbian-Albanian separation.

This means that, if nobody has contradicted President Despic so far, and if we know the importance of SANU for the Manifested Fate of Serbia in the Balkans, then it is quite clear that something serious is being cooked up! If we add to all this the importance of Serbia and Albania for the Balkans, for Europe, and for the United States, together with the messy and undefined interests of all of them together, at least two directions for further analyses can be traced:

First, what will be achieved with the Serbian-Albanian separation in geographical and strategic terms? Will Serbia, including all the others with it (Russia, France), be reinforced or weakened? Will Albania, including all the others with it (the United States, Germany, Italy), be reinforced or weakened?

Second, can this Balkan interethnic separation be carried out without an explosion and without its spreading to the south? After such a mythological and spiritual blow to the all-Serbian psyche, Serbia can only be reinforced if it obtains territorial concessions elsewhere. Where else if not in Macedonia, for which Pasic even gave up Serbia in the First World War? If Albania is reinforced with Kosovo, will it not profit too much and, following the law of hegemony, will it not ask for and get Western Macedonia?

Finally, where is the place of Greece here, and what about Bulgaria?

Without casting any doubt on the skill of the creators of this academic mess, which was first announced by the father of the nation Dobrica Cosic once upon a time—in due time, we can now predict that Serbia will not give up anything. The creators of the Greater Serbian Manifested Fate cannot accept total defeat only because they have lost one war, or one battle (poor us).

Serbia will most probably play on the possible U.S.-German resistance to partition, something that the Serbs have already announced as categorically ill-intentioned, and will propose regionalization: Enlargement of the Federation with Macedonia and Kosovo, as an already established federal and constitutional unit. Very skillfully, considering that Europe and the United States currently have no other solutions for the Russian Imperial position in the world and in the Balkans, let alone for its intermingled interests that are their first priority, and therefore they would not oppose a provisional consolidation with a Buffer State, although they know that the two previous attempts for Yugoslavia ended in bloodshed.

Someone Else's Blood

An attenuated federation, permanently without Slovenia and provisionally without Bosnia and Croatia, as a regional formula, would calm down the Germans and the Americans, the Bulgarians and the Russians. Macedonia, on the one hand, would no longer be an independent entity, but at its expense Albania would not be expanded. Macedonia would no longer be a state exposed to influence and local hegemony, but it would also not be an integral part of Serbia, which would be additionally calmed down with Kosovo and its status. Macedonia would keep its only strategic comparative advantage: To allow control over Serbia, to calm down its [Serbian] position, to assuage the Albanian appetites and pressures on Washington and Europe, without creating a Greater Albania and additional partitions. All this will be accompanied by a multiethnic dampener on the Road to Russia's Warm Seas and the complication of the German "Drang Nach Osten."

Ultimately, even the Albanians are pleased—their first alternative to Greater Albania will come true: All the Albanians outside Albania will be in one state, in

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

which they will be the second major nation, and as a constitutional factor, they will be running the state and political events according to the tested roads of the ruling condominium in Macedonia. From what Despic says, all they need to do to become the first nation in the Federation is wait. Why not: Even Albania fulfills the conditions for such a future superstructure on the regional approach towards the Balkans.

The oasis of peace [Macedonia] may even keep its name, and some of its leaders will surely have big roles in the higher levels of the federation, if not the top. But it will not be of Lilic's kind.

These are just alternative scenarios for the possible outcome. They are particularly dangerous at a time when the European cartographers are gushing forth. The slide rule does not pay attention to small nations, especially if these small nations are spoken for by somebody in advance in order to let them live in peace in the Balkans, but also in New Zealand and elsewhere [reference to migration of Macedonian population].

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Poland: President on 'Favorable' Election Outcome in Russia

LD0407122196 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1100 GMT 4 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] President Aleksander Kwasniewski has voiced the belief that, after the elections in Russia, we are in a situation that is somewhat clearer and all in all favorable. At a meeting with businessmen devoted to promoting the Mazovia region, Kwasniewski said that the winner was President Yeltsin, who is not an easy partner but who fosters friendly intentions toward Poland and Europe.

We know who won the elections, said the president, but for the moment we do not know whether the stronger ruler in Russia will be Prime Minister Chernomyrdin or General Lebed, or whether Yeltsin himself, after a brief medical ailment, will really rule the country. But the president believes that Yeltsin's victory has created a situation that clearly settles the atmosphere in the region and in international relations.

Poland: Politicians React to Predictions of Yeltsin Victory

WS0407102296 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 4 Jul 96 p 1

[Article by "ROS": "First Postelection Reflections of Polish Politicians"]

[FBIS Translated Text] ***Bronislaw Geremek, chairman of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Commission:*** "Zyuganov's victory would bring transformation processes in the economy and in the state to a standstill. Yeltsin cuts himself off from communism. I do see certain threats, however, regardless of who is the winner. The winner has to take the expectations of his voters and his rival's platform into consideration. The winner for the time being is General Lebed."

Piotr Marciniak, deputy chairman of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Commission: "Regardless of who wins, the very way the elections proceed will influence Russia's foreign policy. The elections have meant that political elites are unwilling to open up to Europe. They tend to pull out and look to the past they wish to reconcile with. Zyuganov's victory would crown that trend. The second element is General Lebed's success. This is very important, particularly in view of Yeltsin's health and his slackened political dynamics. Yeltsin will no longer be the type of politician he was one or two years ago: making pragmatism and a more or less hardline ideological language meet."

Former President Lech Walesa, having learned that forecasts indicated Yeltsin would win, said only: "My congratulations." He refused further comment.

Krzysztof Janik (Democratic Left Alliance), under secretary of state at the Presidential Chancellery: "It is very good that Yeltsin will win. It is important, however, that the elections be democratic and that the president be named by the people. Regardless of who is the president, there is no going back to the USSR. We should thus look at Russia calmly. From our standpoint, the Russian president should understand that he is living in a new world, be willing to cooperate with Poland as a serious partner in moving toward Europe, and understand that he ought to seek friends, not enemies, in Europe."

Michal Strak, deputy of the Polish Peasant Party: "Relations between Poland and Russia depend to a certain extent on who is the Russian president, but this is not a decisive factor. I do not feel any special emotions."

Poland: Warsaw Press Reaction to Russian Elections

WS0407140996

[FBIS Report] On 4 July major vernacular Warsaw dailies carry commentaries on the preliminary results of the Russian presidential elections.

RZECZPOSPOLITA, a centrist daily widely read in government circles, carries on page 7 a 450-word commentary by Slawomir Popowski titled "The Price of Victory." "The Wednesday elections," Popowski writes, "have shown only who will be the master of the Kremlin, but not much more. The road Russia will choose to follow remains an open issue." The commentary continues: "Prior to the elections, all Yeltsin's decisions and moves were subordinated to one goal: retaining power—at any price. Those tactics have proved effective. Yeltsin has conquered his rival by a huge lead, which will undoubtedly strengthen his position. The question is, what next and what will be the price of victory?" Popowski writes one thing is certain: "The pace of reforms of which Yeltsin considers himself to be the guarantor will slow down. This is what is expected of him. The support the incumbent president was given is conditional. He is to stabilize the new, post-Soviet system and protect it against shocks, not destroy it by introducing new radical changes. Albeit it does not seem probable Yeltsin will keep his promise and establish a government of national unity with the communists (if only because he had a huge lead on Zyuganov), working out a compromise of some sort will be necessary." "Now," the commentary states, "everything will return to 'normal.' Fierce rivalry for power and influence will begin once more. A new star was born at the Kremlin—General

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Aleksandr Lebed. Many Russians, among them devoted 'democrats,' see him as the benevolent *batyushka czar* [father czar], who can 'introduce order.' Lebed 'the saviour,' however, will be a rival in the power struggle for Yeltsin, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, Yuriy Luzhkov—the very influential mayor of Moscow—and for many other potential hopefuls whose names we have yet to learn. Even if the economic situation becomes stable, which is not that certain, considering that at least a minimum of the preelection promises will have to be kept, political peace seems unlikely." Popowski concludes: "All of this is taking place at a time when Yeltsin's health raises the question of whether he will make it to the end of his second term and who might succeed him. There are still more questions about the future of Russia than answers."

TRYBUNA, a leftist paper supporting the governing SLD party, carries on page 6 two untitled commentaries by Russian correspondents based in Warsaw.

Valeriy Masterov of the MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI daily says in a 350-word commentary that "the first thing to be expected after the elections is a restructuring of the government." He adds: "The statement made by Lebed that the more representatives of the opposition there are in the government the less the opposition outside the government is not insignificant. That is a very good point. I do not, however, foresee any major changes in Russia's policies, especially foreign policy. Preelection declarations indicate that more attention will be focused on states of the near and far abroad, which are considered friendly toward Russia. More changes may be introduced in domestic policies; we can already see signs of that. They will be related to Aleksander Lebed's joining the governing camp and might pertain predominantly to the security of the citizens."

Alongside Masterov's comment, TRYBUNA carries a 400-word statement by PRAVDA's Mikhail Tretyakov. "These are not final results, only forecasts," says Tretyakov. "It might well be like in that joke circulating in Moscow: 'Zyuganov will win the elections, only he will never be told about it.' Gennadiy Zyuganov has already won in the sense that he forced Yeltsin to adopt a huge part of his platform. If you look at the slogans of the Kremlin group, they resemble those previously raised by the national and patriotic camp. Society cannot pay for the reforms forever. People want specific prospects for the future. The current situation in our country shows people do not have any. There is no incentive to save money or to invest. Entire incomes are spent on everyday necessities. This shows that the economy is sick." Tretyakov goes on: "Yeltsin's victory is largely due to the support of the media, including the state-owned. He was also supported by the West, especially during the G-7 summit in Lyons. Why? Because the West wants a weak Russia, one that would not be capable of resisting pressure in the international arena. The question thus arises of whether we have partnership relations or the domination of some over others. I think that, if Yeltsin wins, his policies will have to change. Because he adopted Zyuganov's precepts, he must implement at least some of them. The question is, however, is he capable?. The state coffer is empty. His promises have already cost dearly." The PRAVDA correspondent concludes by saying that "there is no ground to fear that the earth will quake if the communists win in Russia. The example of Poland has shown that a victory of leftists need not necessarily imply civil war or a dramatic split within society, but can bring stability and economic growth."

The same TRYBUNA carries an untitled front-page, 200-word commentary under the "One Hundred Words" rubric by Wieslaw S. Debski. "The first election results," writes Debski, "indicate that the Russians have chosen a president they have known for five years of rule. Even if those years were not the best, the hope that those to come will not be worse has prevailed." The author says Yeltsin "is expected to continue market reforms, observe European principles of ruling, and respect the opposition and civic freedoms, although the election campaign of the Kremlin camp has somewhat dampened the optimism of analysts. Each campaign, however, has its own dynamics. Everyday life with its problems sets in afterwards. We hope this time it will be no different."

GAZETA WYBORCZA carries on page 1 a 100-word commentary by Chief Editor Adam Michnik entitled "Unclear Signal." According to Michnik, "Boris Yeltsin's success means Russia will probably remain what it was." "The power of communists and the weakness of the communists, however, should not be underestimated," he warns. The commentary concludes: "Polish diplomats will have to intensify their efforts to have Poland join NATO and the EU. The signal we are receiving from Russia is far from clear."

Poland: Austria's Vranitzky Holds Talks on NATO, EU

AU0307202796 Vienna ORF Teletext in German 1900 GMT 3 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] On the first day of his visit to Poland, Chancellor Vranitzky held talks with President Kwasniewski and Prime Minister Cimoszewicz. The subjects discussed included Poland's efforts to acquire membership in the EU, NATO's eastward expansion, and business.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Kwasniewski said that Poland was hoping for Austrian support in its admission negotiations with the EU. Kwasniewski said that Austria plays a "special role in Central Europe."

Concerning Poland's wish to join NATO, Vranitzky said that Austria and Poland were pursuing two different concepts in this regard, but with the common goal of contributing to security in Europe.

Poland: Albright Seeks Support in Replacing UN Head

WS0407144196 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 4 Jul 96 p 3

[Article by "KRZEM": "Ms. Albright in Poland; Cutting Down the UN"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The United States wants Poland's support in replacing the UN secretary general.

Madeleine Albright, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, met with Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati in Warsaw yesterday. The United States is very critical of how the UN is functioning and does not want incumbent Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali reelected for a second term. The United States is trying to win the support of members of the Security Council. Poland is among them for the period 1996-97. The new secretary general is to be elected in September.

"We generally agree in opinions," said Minister Rosati. "A reform of the UN is necessary; the organization should be cut down in size and become more effective. Poland will consult on the steps it takes with major partners—namely, the EU and the United States."

Ms. Albright added that the United States will cooperate with Poland in the process of selecting candidates for the position of secretary general.

Asked by reporters whether this meant Poland would not support Butrus-Ghali if he ran for a second term, Minister Rosati said that Poland has not taken an official stance on the subject yet.

Poland: Goals of President's Visit to U.S. Defined

WS0407105496 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 4 Jul 96 p 5

[Report by "AN": "The President Meets With Politicians Before His Visit to the United States; NATO, Auschwitz, Visas"]

[FBIS Translated Text] What should he try to obtain for Poland during his visit to the United States, which will begin on Friday [5 July]? Aleksander Kwasniewski sought advice from the heads of parliamentary clubs and circles yesterday. He had done the same before his visit to Russia.

After the meeting, Professor Bronislaw Geremek, chairman of the Sejm Foreign Affairs Commission and of the Freedom Union Deputies Club, told journalists that the president "agrees with most of the advice he was offered; he will present the results of the visit when he returns."

Here are the main goals of Kwasniewski's visit, as presented by Presidential Spokesman Antoni Styrczula:

—persuading the United States to take a clear stand on NATO expansion;

—presenting possibilities of development in Central and East Europe;

—discussing Polish-American cooperation;

—presenting a program of ordering a protection zone around the Auschwitz museum.

"The Jewish diaspora in the United States is interested in what is going on in Polish-Jewish relations," Styrczula added.

Geremek told journalists: "The talk was a good opportunity to present issues that are part of Poland's national interest. We hope that during this visit we will hear an answer regarding NATO."

According to the professor, the visit will also be a chance to obtain U.S. aid to support transformation processes in Poland, as well as an opportunity to bring up a rather unpleasant issue for Poles—the problem of granting visas to Poles traveling to the United States.

Andrzej Gasiennica-Makowski (Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms) added: "We tried to persuade the president to inform his interlocutors that restitution of former Jewish property is not possible."

It is worth recalling that, although Jewish communities seem to be making such demands, Poland is not planning to have a separate law on the restitution of former Jewish property. Such a law would have to be preceded by a general reprivatization law, which is not ready yet. Nonetheless, a law on restitution of property to Jewish communities has been submitted in the Sejm.

Poland: More on Kwasniewski's Visit to U.S.

WS0507111696 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 5 Jul 96 p 7

[Article by Krystyna Szelestowska: "The President Is Going to the United States"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *On Friday, Aleksander Kwasniewski will fly aboard a regular airline plane to*

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

the United States; it will be his first presidential visit to America. On Saturday and Sunday [6-7 July], he will stay in New York City, where he is going to spend a considerable part of his time talking with Polish journalists. Before his political meetings in Washington, Kwasniewski wants to have some sort of "brainstorming" session; he would like to take advantage of the opinions and expertise of the people who work and live in the United States.

On Sunday he is scheduled to meet with representatives of Polonia communities of New York and the East Coast region. It will be the first meeting of the new Polish president with the American Polonia, which, as is known, supported Lech Walesa in the presidential elections. It is difficult to say right now who will attend the meeting, the more so because the president's visit will coincide with the long weekend in the United States; it began on Thursday, which was a national holiday.

On Monday [8 July] President Kwasniewski will begin his working visit to Washington, which will last two and a half days and will be full of talks. The most important talk, with President Bill Clinton, will begin on Monday at 1100. As TRYBUNA was told by Andrzej Majkowski, under secretary of state in the Presidential Chancellery, Aleksander Kwasniewski intends to present himself and the Polish economic and political transformations, as well as stress processes of democratization. He wants to say that Polish society is unanimous as far as Poland's integration with NATO is concerned. He wants to discuss bilateral relations and many other issues. "The president," Minister Majkowski said, "is prepared to discuss any issues the host wants to bring up." [passage omitted]

President Kwasniewski's itinerary envisions a veritable marathon of meetings with members of the U.S Administration, such as Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Secretary of Defense William Perry, and new Secretary of Commerce Mickey Kantor. The president also will meet with members of the Senate. In addition, he is scheduled to hold talks at the Pentagon, although Majkowski would not divulge to us whether we would be buying military hardware in the United States, and, if so, what kind. Kwasniewski also will meet with representatives of the business world at the Chamber of Commerce, which will be important from the economic point of view.

The itinerary also envisages a visit to the Holocaust Museum, where Kwasniewski is to submit to Jewish communities for discussion the "Auschwitz Program," and he will hold a meeting with representatives of Jewish organizations (in New York City on his way back). [passage omitted]

Poland: Defense Minister To Visit PRC, Discuss Accords

WS0307140896 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 3 Jul 96 p 5

[Report by Pawel Wronski: "Defense Minister Goes to China; Chinese Generals in Jastarnia?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Chinese officers will spend their holidays in Poland, and Polish officers will spend theirs in China—that is, if Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski signs an agreement on holiday exchanges with the PRC Armed Forces.

Minister Dobrzanski is departing for China on 4 July and will stay for one week. According to Lieutenant Colonel Eugeniusz Mleczak, spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense, the Chinese are also interested in exchanges of military academy students.

At the request of the Chinese, an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation will be discussed as well.

"China has expressed preliminary interest in our Orlik planes and Sokol helicopters. It is a very interesting and profitable market," stressed Lt. Col. Mleczak.

Poland: Kwasniewski Views Domestic Political Scene

WS0307130596 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 1 Jul 96 pp 12-13

[Article by Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski; from the series "Threat Over Poland?": "Fear or Hope?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is both easy and difficult to join the discussion in which so much has been said on so many issues and from such different standpoints. It is easy because many charges have already been seriously countered. It is difficult because it is impossible to speak out on all of the issues raised, and the way they are selected will always be censored and criticized by polemists and readers.

GAZETA WYBORCZA has every right to carry a debate on potential threats. This is undoubtedly far more interesting than construing optimistic visions which, we must admit, can be boring. I do wish, however, to appeal to some of the authors who spoke out in GAZETA WYBORCZA: Gentlemen, let us stop threatening each other. Poland, thank God, faces more chances than threats today. No foreign troops are planning to invade our territory. The composition of the current government was not decided abroad. Polish society is not sick, and

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

neither is the state in crisis. The economy is developing, relations with our neighbors are more than appropriate, and the prospect of integrating with European and Euro-Atlantic structures is ever more distinct.

Some of the threats described in GAZETA WYBORCZA are purely illusory. Many symptoms of the condition of the collective psyche and morality of the Poles cannot and should not be described in categories of threats and social illnesses. They should, first of all, be understood.

Some threats, however, do exist. Some of them have already become real; others are potential. Perhaps it is a question of age and temperament, but at the age of 40 it is difficult to see threats all around and look toward the future with pessimism. Even more so if you are 30 or 20. I believe that threats must spur action and a search for preventive measures, and not provoke speculation as to who might prove a traitor or a defector in a time of crisis.

The need for optimism probably does not come naturally for publicists, but it should be obvious for a politician. In the course of my election campaign it was important for me to focus on the necessity of development, the need for stability, justice, eliminating conflicts, and security. The success of such an option should not be seen as the voters' loss of national identity. Perhaps it would be more appropriate to ask why no one else has come up with similar ideas. Even if they have, why do they not have the courage to come out with them in public?

There is no threat to Poland's independence at the moment. That is why tracking down a "fifth column" is a futile effort, verging on persecution mania. The conviction that the future of Poland and the future of Europe will depend on our attempts at cooperation, that we will be witnesses to the victory of international cooperation over isolationism and conflict, and not spymania, should be the moving force behind our patriotism. Different things might happen in the future, many conflicts and uncertainties lie ahead. The most important thing for the future of Poland, however, will be how we meet the challenges of economic transformation and integration with West Europe. Unless we concentrate on those issues, we are headed for serious trouble.

These are only words. Yet they do have their practical implications. We have to answer a couple of questions: Will modern patriotism take the upper hand so that we can modernize our country? Will we be able to reduce the social costs of transformation? Will we eradicate the remnants of national egocentrism, parochialism, xenophobia, and the conviction that we have a historical mission to fulfill? Can we prevent an ideologized version of history from dominating the collective mind? From the Polish perspective, the most important thing is to avoid being degraded into the third league in the 21st century, so that we do not find ourselves on the pale of global civilizational processes.

Professor Janusz Reykowski has already thoroughly discussed the issue of future challenges for Poland—both known and unknown. Those challenges, however, can be seen not only in the 10-year perspective, as Reykowski chose, but also over the next few years.

I would first like to focus on our prospects and possibilities. Economic growth gives grounds for the brightest outlooks. It should be protected by continuing to fight inflation and spur ownership transformations in a clear and lucid way. Only economic growth can guarantee greater riches, generate new jobs, and facilitate structural changes within the economy. A great chance lies in continuing the reform of the state administration structure, as well as activating the reserves of the regions and the potential of self-governments. A further chance lies in supporting the educational boom that flared up as a result of the transformations. Progress on the path toward European and Euro-Atlantic integration is extremely important for Poland. It will guarantee us permanent security, development, and democracy.

This is a good opportunity to dispel the myth that Poland is currently threatened by a second vassalage—this time to the United States and Germany. The international system we are aspiring toward is completely different from what it was when we left it. The differences run deeper than its voluntary character. Relations between states of the Western commonwealth are much more partnerlike than they appear from Poland.

This poses challenges we must consider. No one will give us prizes for past accomplishments. Neither will anyone protect us in a special way. Jerzy Giedroyc wrote about this. We must first solve our problems ourselves. Strengthening our position on the international arena should thus be seen primarily as a concern to be competitive in all possible fields, to carry out an ongoing campaign promoting Poland in the world. The fact that currently the doors of the Presidential Palace hardly close because so many representatives of various countries and various foreign communities visiting are curious to learn about the success of the Polish transformations is by no means due to the fact that there are no other opportunities to hold talks in English. Our country simply needs to incessantly boost its international image.

The major threats to Poland, as I see them today, are internal. The gravest one would be throttling economic growth and a triumph of Euro-skepticism in

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Poland. Throttling economic growth would jeopardize the prospect of solving the most acute social problems for generations to come and disrupt the process of integration with the EU, which would in turn widen the civilizational gap between us and developed countries. Hampering economic growth and contacts with Brussels might become conceivable if the public was led to believe security and prosperity required not a continuation of reform or practical steps toward integration, but an "awakening" of Poland, a moral shock for the Poles, or a further nondescript renewal. Those threats do not require much to take real shape.

They are equally dangerous to Poland—as a potential decline of international relations in Europe might prove. The malady our society is suffering from, manifesting itself in the tendency to destroy political rivals and to ideologize all public debates and in the inability to work out compromises, is already a fact. It might have an influence—perhaps it already has—on economic processes and legislative procedures associated with integration.

There are political groups in Poland which advocate a simultaneous decrease of expenses and taxes. There are political forces that see foreign investment as a threat to Poland, and not as an additional factor boosting economic and civilizational growth. They have repeatedly tried to test the susceptibility of the Polish voter to populist and nationalist slogans. They are unlikely to give up, just like today nothing can keep them from spreading myths of mass enfranchisement. They fail to recognize the fact that Polish industry and agriculture require sweeping reform and restructuring.

The evaluation of the facts of life is undergoing a profound change in Poland; basic beliefs are being revised. Some find it difficult to rationalize all the changes that have taken place in their workplaces, in their families, in society, and to apply those changes to their own life plans. People are seeking new truths and rules of conduct. This sometimes manifests itself as a deep crisis of opinion, when the entire system of existing values is reviewed. Hence, there is greater susceptibility to irregularities.

This is not yet a mass psychosis. Poles were the best prepared to live in a market economy and in a democracy out of all the Eastern bloc states. Our society has not lost the ability to think rationally or to make decisions on its own. I agree that one generation is needed, but changes in the mentality of Poles are taking place rapidly—far more rapidly than a generation span.

Charges leveled against a vast majority of Poles—accusing them of a lack of patriotism, allegedly manifesting itself as "wrongly" cast votes in elections and as an indifference to the celebrations of anniversaries—can hardly be considered serious. Moreover, one hardly has anything to with the other. Charges of a lack of patriotism and lack of ideology brought against whole social groups and communities should be contended. Perhaps it should be considered whether the prevailing practice of recent years of exploiting anniversaries and national holidays is not the main source of discouragement with patriotic ostentatiousness.

Those deputies who did not join the Sejm's condemnation of the Soviet invasion of 1920, as Jan Nowak-Jezioranski [author of the article launching the debate, GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 29 May "Can History Repeat Itself?" p 18] pointed out, made an obvious mistake. I have not heard anyone exculpating them. Does that mean one could conclude they would join the cavalry of Budyonny [commander of the 1st Cavalry on the Polish front of the Polish-Soviet war of 1920] if he attacked Warsaw once more? Rather, should it not be assumed that they voted the way they did in protest to the practice of regularly introducing history to parliamentary debates and using it to assault political rivals?

I am against using history for the purpose of current political polemics. Political life in Poland cannot consist in continually proving who and why is or is not the historical heir of Rzewuski and Szczesny Potocki [prominent leaders of the Targowica Confederation, which led to the Second Partition of Poland in 1792]. Can patriotism not be manifested in other ways? Even if we do accept Jan Nowak-Jezioranski's train of thought, did not foreign superpowers encourage sentimentalist patriotism, brawling, and platitude among Poles in the past?

I cannot agree to questioning the patriotism of people who were active in various structures of the Polish People's Republic. Was there only one way of being a patriot in Poland after the war? There was, after all, no real choice between the Polish Soviet Republic and the government-in-exile [based in London since World War II, dissolved during Lech Walesa's presidency]. Poland was never Sovietized, and the London-based Zamek [Polish emigre camp] did not have enough authority to dominate even the political emigres alone. Was October 1956 and the attitude of Gomulka [former first secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party] toward Kruschev not a reason for Polish pride, regardless of what they thought of the Yalta system and the world order it brought? Was it inadmissible to entertain the thought that opening up Poland to the West in the 1970's expanded our sphere of freedom and that it was worth pursuing that course?

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

The turmoil in the world of politics and in the media undoubtedly makes it difficult to understand where Poland is going. Many politicians and publicists seem to be guided by the grim objective of removing the currently governing camp from power. They consider any alternative better. They seem to be losing from view such issues as pluralism, the will of the majority, and the need to reform the state and the economy. It is difficult to overcome the impression that some politicians and intellectuals rooted in Solidarity are not far from questioning the very principles of political and economic changes taking place in Poland since 1989 if an exotic alliance with populists offering a chance of removing the Democratic Left Alliance from power so requires.

Pluralism means one has to come to terms with the fact that there exist various points of view and that the biographies of public figures are not the same. In politics, victories are not won by words. Why the publicists' huge nostalgia for "moral and political unity," for a cause that would array and define targets? Politics is not only about the rivalry of causes, but the ability of securing social and political support for them. Why did the Poles vote for the left? Because they had a choice and they knew who they were choosing from.

Questioning the moral right of politicians to win elections and participate in public life is irrational. What could the consequences of denying them those rights be? When I read and hear divagations on the subject, I always wonder why some of the post-Solidarity elites focus on methods of eliminating "postcommunists" from public life in their analyses. Is it truly the expression of their moral strength, the superiority of their platforms, and their love of democracy? Do they really have the best interests of Poland at heart?

My concept of a "Poland for all" does not assume attempts at unifying Poland around one political program, force, or leader. I am deeply convinced, however, that there is a field of higher and common interests that is indispensable for meeting state needs. There is no major split of opinions among citizens on major issues. People do not hide behind walls only because of their views or their past. The drive toward understanding and dialogue is a natural social need. Politicians from all sides and the media have an obvious role to play in this respect. Political elites should seek understanding on basic issues and talk to each other, even if they do have differing views.

As the old system was collapsing in Poland seven years ago, we were given the example of the peaceful transformation of Spain. I think we have learned that lesson and passed our test well. There is, however, a significant difference between Poland and Spain. Did you see how the changing of the guard recently took place in Spain? With responsibility and respect—most of all for the state and democracy, if not for political rivals. One might state that the times of tension in Spain are over. I still clearly remember the televised picture of Shimon Peres and Benyamin Netanyahu standing side by side—and more importantly—talking with each other after a tough, brutal election campaign shaded by the murder of Yitzhaq Rabin. Where the state and the raison d'etat are at stake, you have to overcome divisions, resentment, even hatred.

We should learn how to change governments with style, how to talk and cooperate on issues of fundamental importance for the nation and the state. There is still too much antagonism between politicians and political parties. This does not bode well for the future. Unless this changes, the political class might, unfortunately, cause more bitter experience for Poles.

Poland: Pentagon Offer To Purchase Tanks for Bosnia Declined

WS0307141596 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 3 Jul 96 p 4

[Report by Jacek Kalabinski in Washington and Pawel Wronski in Warsaw: "Polish T-72's Will Not Go to Bosnia; We Will Not Give Tanks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The Pentagon offered to purchase 45 T-72 tanks from Poland. They would be handed over to the future Bosnian Armed Forces. "We do not have tanks," was the reply of the Polish authorities.*

The Americans wanted to purchase tanks in Poland via the Bosnia Training and Equipment Fund. It has at its disposal funds allocated for the reconstruction of the Bosnian state. The Bosnian Armed Forces currently use equipment manufactured on the basis of Russian technology. That is why the Americans targeted Poland as the key supplier of tanks. The T-72 of Polish make was constructed in the USSR and is light enough to cross Bosnian bridges. A small number of tanks was to be handed over free of charge; the rest would be purchased by the Fund. The Americans claim that the transaction would have been beneficial for Poland. Muslim countries, the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom are to be the major suppliers of the Bosnian Armed Forces.

U.S. military experts were astonished by our government's refusal. Two years ago, as one of the largest producers of armored equipment, Poland had carried out exports to Iran. Last year, we sold a mere two tanks (to Sierra Leone). The supplies to Bosnia could have been

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

the largest contract signed by Bumar-Labedy [tank manufacturer] in three years.

"We know nothing of the U.S. offer," we heard at Cenzin, the arms-trading agency [part of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Cooperation], which usually acts as an intermediary in sales of armored military equipment.

"Such a contract cannot be realized within a couple of months. From what I know, however, we have not stopped producing armored equipment," said Andrzej Spis from the Industry Ministry.

"We currently do not have any tanks in stock," Lieutenant Colonel Eugeniusz Mleczak, spokesman of the Ministry of National Defense, said curtly. "As for the contract with the Pentagon, I neither confirm nor deny it."

Unofficial sources claim that the reasons for the refusal were political. Having a battalion in the IFOR forces in Bosnia, Poland does not want the sides of the Bosnian conflict to have the impression that anyone is being favored.

Poland: SLD Official Rejects 'Astounding Opinions' on Concordat

LD0407182296 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1342 GMT 4 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 4 Jul—Jerzy Szmajdzinski, chairman of the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] parliamentary floor group, on 4 July issued a statement responding to a "series of astounding opinions and statements" following the Sejm decision to postpone the ratification of the Concordat until the adoption of the new constitution.

Deputy Tadeusz Mazowiecki in his Sejm statement in essence spoke against the principles of democracy, denying deputies who behave differently from him the right to represent Polish society, noted Szmajdzinski. Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, general secretary of the Episcopate, in his comments accuses the supporters of the solution adopted by the Sejm of base motives and undemocratic behavior. He is clearly engaging in political agitation, thereby revealing the Catholic Church's great predicament in a democratic Poland, which amounts to an inability to treat the voters' will calmly and with respect. This position indicates the absence in the thinking of some representatives of the church hierarchy of faith in the Poles' inner sovereignty, emphasized the SLD leader.

Under the circumstances, the SLD parliamentary floor group deems it appropriate to reject the accusations firmly and recall that identifying anyone's attitude toward an international agreement with his attitude toward religion and faith represents political and intellectual abuse. Thanks to the prevailing legislation, the churches in Poland enjoy full rights and have every condition for unrestricted pursuance of their missions.

The SLD parliamentary floor group believes that the Concordat agreement contains unsound formulations. All of the group's actions are prompted by a desire to ensure such formulation of the Concordat provisions as would respect the legal order and the sovereignty of the state, without arousing anyone's fears about potential misuse or arbitrary interpretation. That is the purpose that is to be served by the renegotiation initiatives suggested by the group.

We are most astounded that the supporters of the immediate ratification of the agreement have failed to notice that the situation that exists after the Sejm's latest decisions provides time and conditions for finding compromise solutions. We have nothing against seeking such compromise through continued talks between the Government of the Polish Republic and the Holy See, emphasized Szmajdzinski.

The controversies surrounding the Concordat relate to a fundamental issue. It is not a question of power or political games, as our opponents maintain, but an answer to the question of what constitutes the basis of our state. Is it the highest-ranking legislative act—that is, the constitution—or is it agreements concluded with the state in conditions of pressure being exerted on its representatives?

We believe that the basis of the state is the constitution. This point of view is respected by the democratic countries of our cultural environment. That is why we say, first the act that constitutes the state, adopted by parliament and approved by the citizens, and only then international agreements that affect the country's internal life.

This manner of thinking finds clear support in the attitude of the public, which is shown by the results of public opinion polls, emphasized the chairman of the SLD parliamentary floor group.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Romania: Anti-Iliescu Slogan Heard During Mrs. Clinton Visit

AU0407105196

[FBIS Report] Bucharest daily EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian on 2 July on page 1 publishes, in both Romanian and English, a "Note Addressed to Mrs. Clinton on What Happened in Revolution Square: Hillary Clinton Was Received by the Bucharesters With the Traditional Romanian Wish of 'Down With Iliescu.'"

The Romanian version reads as follows:

"Dear Mrs. Clinton,

"The enthusiastic slogans you heard yesterday while laying a wreath in Revolution square were not 'Long live American-Romanian friendship,' but rather 'Down with Iliescu.' Which practically amounts to the same thing.

"Ion Iliescu was born in 1930 in the city of Oltenita. He has been leading Romania for an eternity.

"Taking into account that he is going to run again for the presidency, he will lead the country for an even longer eternity."

Romania: Iliescu Justifies Meeting With PDSR Leadership

AU0407151896 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1953 GMT 3 Jul 96

[Statement by Romanian President Ion Iliescu following the meeting of the Central Executive Bureau of the Social Democracy Party of Romania in Bucharest on 3 July—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Iliescu] I have complied with the request of the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] leadership asking me to attend the meeting of their central executive bureau. I heard that some people are already commenting on this, objecting to me meeting the PDSR people and claiming that, by doing so, I am siding with this party. Well, I would like to point out that I have always been and still am open to any political party. Should the Democratic Convention of Romania, the PSDR [Romanian Social-Democratic Party], or the PAC [Civic Alliance Party], for instance, decide to invite me to meet with their leadership, I would certainly not refuse. I have pointed this out several times. So, if anyone feels the need to hold such a consultative meeting with me, I remain open for anyone.

Furthermore, this meeting with the PDSR executive bureau has a particular connotation, namely that the four-year term, both of Parliament [words indistinct] and of the presidential term. Back in 1992, when I ran for the presidency, I was the candidate of the FDSN [Democratic National Salvation Front], that is, the current PDSR. Therefore, I do have a moral obligation to meet with them, to attend their analysis work intended to prepare this party for the future electoral campaign, their examination of the returns of the recent local elections, and elaborating preparatory measures in view of the forthcoming legislative elections.

From this point of view, I would term today's meeting as a useful one, as everyone in the central executive bureau openly stated his view while examining the local election returns. It also offered me the possibility to express some of my opinions in connection with the new examination that the party, as well as the entire Romanian political life, is facing this autumn. I hope that there will be less absenteeism than in the local elections, that more citizens will turn out to vote. This depends on the previous activity of all the political parties, including the PDSR, or above all the PDSR, as this party currently bears the responsibility of governing the country and has to be well prepared from every point of in view of the examination that Romanian political life will be taking at the beginning of November.

[Announcer] Dear listeners, as you probably realized, today's proceedings of the PDSR central executive bureau brought no new elements, in the sense that speculations around a possible government reshuffle have not been confirmed, nor did President Iliescu announce whether he intended to run for a new presidential term.

Romania: Constantinescu Confident of Election Victory

AU0207170296 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 27 Jun 96 p 3

[Report by A.M. Press: "Emil Constantinescu: 'I Do Not Consider Ion Iliescu a Serious Adversary'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Emil Constantinescu, presidential candidate of the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR], says he is certain he will place first in the first round of balloting during this fall's presidential elections and that he will win the runoff as well. Mr. Constantinescu says it does not matter that 10 to 15 candidates will be running in the presidential race this year because now he is sufficiently popular and represents the strongest political force in the country; namely, the CDR. Furthermore, the CDR leader asserts that he is not afraid of any of the other candidates who might make it to the runoff. "I do not consider Ion Iliescu a serious adversary. He has a considerable handicap because he has not fulfilled the electoral promises he made in 1992. Now he will have to explain why he has not done anything, not even for the Constitution to be observed,

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

even though has been holding the levers of power in his hands for the past six years," stated Emil Constantinescu.

The CDR president's electoral program is organized into three principal chapters. The first refers to the constitutional attributes of the president; the second to the ways and means of cooperating with other state authorities; while the third describes the way Emil Constantinescu intends to solve Romania's problems. The CDR president says he will publish his program officially as he wishes to avoid a situation similar to that which occurred in 1992, when instead of promoting their own programs, the candidates did nothing but attack each other.

Romania: Iron Guard Considers Running in Nov Elections

AU0407154296 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 2 Jul 96 p 7

[Unattributed report: "The Iron Guard Movement Wants Seats in Parliament"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Being present in Constanta to hold a conference titled "Who Is Afraid of the Iron Guard Movement," in the company of representatives of other seven Iron Guard nests [cuiburi] from various parts of the country, Serban Suru, the head of the Iron Guard Movement in Romania, asserted that he is pondering over the possibility for that movement to run in this fall's parliamentary elections. If yes, their candidates would run on the slates of the "Everything for the Country" Traditional Party. He added that he does not expect the Iron Guard members to obtain seats in Parliament yet, as the movement does not currently have many followers, but he predicts a bright future.

Romania: Price Hikes Discussed With Employers, Unions

AU0307074596 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1600 GMT 2 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu, together with other government members, held separate talks at the Victoria Palace [government headquarters] with representatives of the employers' organizations and trade union confederations to establish the social protection measures necessary following the recent price hikes.

In the speech he made during his meeting with the representatives of the employers, the prime minister detailed the objective domestic and international factors that determined the rising of the fuel, as well as the electricity and heating prices, explaining that the changes are part of the policy to adjust prices and fees to the level on the raw material world market, the leu-dollar exchange rate, and production costs. The prime minister pointed out that the purpose of the talks with the employers is to establish as correctly as possible the dimensions of the compensations and indexations to be granted by the government to diminish the impact of the price hikes on the population.

Assessing that the measure taken by the government is opportune, necessary, and imposed by the market economy, the representatives of the employers' organizations emphasized the fact that the Romanian employers consider it necessary to effectively involve themselves in the making of such decisions and to spot appropriate solutions.

The sides agreed to hold a joint meeting of the government with the employers' organizations, trade union confederations, and the pensioners' associations. This meeting is expected to take place by the end of this week, a government release states.

During his talks with the trade union confederations, the Romanian prime minister pointed out that the price increase was carried out in the summer season, when its impact on the consumers is reduced, after which he emphasized the stringent need for the measures taken, which were intended to maintain macroeconomic stability and carry on with the reform process. He also stressed that if prices had not been adapted to those on the world market, the country would have run the risk of being unable to set up energy reserves for the coming winter and a blocking of the energy system due to the lack of financial resources.

Referring to the bread price hikes, Vacaroiu pointed out that the principal reason is the augmentation of the minimum guaranteed purchasing price of the wheat to be harvested this year, from 240 to 450 lei per kilogram.

Then they discussed the mechanism adopted by the government to protect the population in the context of the current price rises. The trade union representatives were offered detailed information underlying the government's decision to refresh certain prices, as well as the proposals of the government to protect the population and maintain its purchasing level at its current level.

The sides agreed to continue the negotiations later tonight, after the aforementioned documents have been carefully examined, says the information bulletin released by the government.

According to our correspondent, government representatives are currently holding talks with representatives

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

of the CNSLR-Fratia [National Confederation of Romania's Free Trade Unions], the Alfa Cartel, the National trade Union Bloc, and the Confederation of democratic Trade Unions of Romania. In a printed document they distributed among the union leaders, the government suggests offering different compensations in the summer and the winter period. The suggested that, beginning with 1 July, monthly net compensations worth 6,719 lei, which corresponds to a monthly gross compensation of 9,340 lei. Beginning with 1 October, this amount is to be increased to a net monthly compensation worth 10,268 lei.

Furthermore, considering that other prices—other than the ones of the products for which they are now to offer compensations—will also rise, the government proposed a 4-percent indexation of all salaries.

The union leaders are to present their own points of view.

In a press statement made today, the World Bank permanent mission in Romania asserts that it took note of the price alterations in the energy sector that were recently announced by the Romanian Government. These alterations, the statement reads, are in concordance with the existing agreements between the Romanian Government and the World Bank and represent a constituent part of the reform process that will lead to all the benefits associated to the transition to the market economy. This courageous action undertaken by the Romanian Government, the document says, is expected to substantially improve the financial performance of the companies doing business in the energy sector and will contribute to the future augmentation of the power supplies available in Romania. Furthermore, this action will stimulate the achievement of higher performance standards in industry, as well as other sectors of national economy. The World Bank continues to support the economic transformations and the reform process in Romania, the statement concludes.

In connection with the recent price hikes, Emil Constantinescu, president of the Democratic Convention of Romania, assesses that this phenomenon is typical for the current Romanian society, as it is triggered by the ceaseless devaluation of the leu, as well as the discrepancy between the fuel price rises on the world market compared with the one on the domestic one.

In the opinion of Democratic Party leader Petre Roman, they should have already managed to achieve the stability of prices and national currency through economic reform. The solution to help the country out of the current crisis, emphasized Roman, would be for this fall's election to lead to the setting up of a competent and able government.

In turn, Petre Cunescu, president of the Romanian Social-Democratic Party, considers that it would be necessary to elaborate a study detailing the consumers' daily basket. This study, which should be worked out by an expert company rather than the National Statistical Board, could offer a realistic basis regarding the dimensions of the compensations and indexations that are to be granted.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Slovenia: Drnovsek Comments on Meeting With Perry, NATO

AU0307205996 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 2100 GMT 3 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry arrived for a short official visit to Slovenia today. He was received by President Milan Kucan and Prime Minister Dr. Janez Drnovsek in Bled. Following the talks with Prime Minister Drnovsek, both he and Perry gave brief statements. Igor Juric reports:

[Begin recording] [Juric] U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry said the talks were good. They discussed regional and international security issues, the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and bilateral security issues between Slovenia and the United States.

During the talks they also discussed NATO enlargement, the timetable for expansion, and Slovenia's chances for joining this military alliance.

Perry said he was very much impressed with Slovene progress toward fulfillment of all five main preconditions for NATO membership since last year's visit. His impression after today's visit was as follows:

[Perry, in English fading into superimposed translation] I must say that I am even more impressed; indeed, I think Slovenia can be a model to numerous Central and East European countries as regards the promotion of democracy and market economy and the solution of conflicts with neighbors.

[Juric] Minister Perry added that Slovenia will not be required to meet any special criteria for membership. He could not comment on the timetable of admission for new members, but Slovenia is a very good candidate.

Slovene Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek was of the opinion that cooperation between the two countries was developing very well and, following the suspension of the arms embargo, cooperation in this area has been picking up as well.

According to Drnovsek, today's talks again confirmed that Slovenia is on its way to becoming a NATO member soon. After the talks, Dr. Drnovsek added:

[Drnovsek] As Slovene prime minister, I reiterated our interest in continuing bilateral cooperation with the United States as well as NATO and the Slovenia's interest in becoming a NATO member, hopefully, in the first round of NATO membership expansion. [end recording]

Slovenia: Kucan, Austria's Klestil Discuss EU, Schengen

AU0407145996 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 4 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] At the invitation of Slovene President Milan Kucan, Austrian President Dr. Thomas Klestil arrived for a working visit to Slovenia this morning. The two presidents held talks in the Villa Bled this morning. In the afternoon they will be attending the ceremonial opening of this year's Carinthian summer festival in Ossiach. Lojze Kos reports:

[Begin recording] With the signing of the EU associate membership agreement, Austrian-Slovene relations have gained a wider European dimension. This was apparent during this morning at over two hours of talks, when Presidents Kucan and Klestil, in addition to bilateral issues, devoted great attention to European issues.

Austria is undoubtedly one of the countries that did the most for Slovenia's European destiny. Dr. Klestil promised Austria's full support and assistance in the final stages of the association act, where the countries will beforehand regulate all issues and problems, such as the Schengen border control regime, that could burden this process.

There is a high degree of political consensus between Slovenia and Austria. The presidents also assessed favorably the economic cooperation. There is no considerable difference of views at the international level, either. The Balkan crisis has tied Slovenia and Austria even more closely and the Karawanken are only a geographical and no longer a political border.

Because of the Slovene minority in Carinthia and Slovene-Carinthian relations, Carinthian Governor Dr. Christoph Zernatto also participated in the talks. Among other things, he gave assurances that the provincial government in Klagenfurt would very soon be regulating the perennially open question of Slovene television transmitters in Carinthia.

Immediately after the talks in Bled, Milan Kucan and Thomas Klestil departed for Carinthia, where they will be attending the ceremonial opening of the Carinthian Summer 1996 festival in Ossiah in a little over an hour. [end recording]

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Serbia

Serbia: Milosevic Receives Carl Bildt in Belgrade

LD0307154196 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1338 GMT 3 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 3 Jul (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic today received Carl Bildt, the international community's high representative for Bosnia.

The talks covered the implementation of the peace agreement and especially preparations for the coming elections. Special reference was made to the issues discussed yesterday by Dr. Biljana Plavsic, acting president of the Serb Republic, and Carl Bildt, which considered the ways of ensuring comprehensive and successful implementation of the Dayton Agreement.

The efforts so far have resulted in positive developments in the process of comprehensive normalization of relations and the carrying out of assumed tasks. They will also facilitate the final stage in which the elections in both entities should take place amid full freedom of movement and the unimpeded presentation of the political forces that will participate in the elections.

Serbia: Milosevic Receives UN Administrator for Slavonia

LD0307161796 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1539 GMT 3 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 3 Jul (TANJUG)—Today, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic received Jacques Klein, the UN administrator for Srem-Baranja region, and his aides.

Administrator Klein informed President Milosevic about the process of implementing the Erdut Agreement and expressed satisfaction with the results achieved so far in implementing it. Demilitarization of the area was completed within the deadline. Joint police patrols have begun operating and attention has now been switched to revitalizing economic activity.

According to Klein, the parties to the agreement are displaying the necessary level of readiness to cooperate with his team. This is making a considerable contribution to continued progress in the process of stabilization in the area and at the same time provides foundations for the future peace and freedom of all citizens.

The need for speeding up economic recovery was emphasized.

Serbia: Plavsic Assures Milosevic of Commitment to Dayton

LD0407155796 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1526 GMT 4 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 4 Jul (TANJUG)—Slobodan Milosevic, president of the republic, had talks today with Biljana Plavsic, acting president of the Serb Republic [RS].

Biljana Plavsic, who took over all the functions of the Serb Republic president on 30 June, gave firm assurances that the Serb Republic and all its bodies will continue to implement the Dayton Agreement fully and successfully.

Making a positive assessment of the course of the peace plan's implementation in the Serb Republic, President Milosevic stressed the importance of the Serb Republic's leaders versatile cooperation with all players involved in the successful implementation of the peace process, and especially in preparations for the elections scheduled for 14 September this year. In this connection, the importance of freedom of movement and freedom to conduct election campaigns by all political parties taking part in the elections was stressed.

According to President Milosevic, the democratic election of the legal institutions in the Serb Republic is in the greatest interest of all its citizens and will certainly contribute to the affirmation of the Serb Republic, whose legally elected institutions should ensure free and peaceful life, full equality, and economic and cultural development for all citizens.

Serbia: GSS's Pesic Says Karadzic Still RS Leader

AU0307162596 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1243 GMT 3 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 3 July (BETA)—Vesna Pesic, chairwoman of the Civic Alliance of Serbia [GSS], has stated today that events in the Serb Republic [RS] are repeating themselves and that Radovan Karadzic is still the president of the Serb Republic.

"What is happening now we already saw in April. Karadzic is still the president, while Biljana Plavsic is just somebody who is negotiating with the international community instead of him," Pesic said at a news conference, assessing that there were no changes in the policy of the Serb Republic, nor should any be expected. [passage omitted]

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Serbia: Serbian Opposition Leader on Karadzic's Withdrawal

LD0407173196 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1125 GMT 4 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 4 Jul (SRNA)—Kosta Cavoski, chairman of the Main Committee of Serbian Liberal Party (SLS), has said that the decision by the Serb Democratic Party [SDS] to put forward Biljana Plavsic as its candidate for president of the Serb Republic "deserves full respect because she enjoys the undivided support of the people."

"Foreign string-pullers do not want Biljana Plavsic, but someone else who is more pliable and cooperative, as Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic has been for a long time now," Cavoski said at a news conference in Belgrade at which he pointed out that Mrs. Plavsic "represents very well the program of the SDS that Dr. Radovan Karadzic heads."

According to him, the international community, by stipulating who can and who cannot stand as a candidate in the September elections has destroyed the principle of free elections because, he said, "the people should choose whom they want, and they should not have someone imposed on them." [passage omitted]

Serbia: Karadzic's 'Willingness To Make Sacrifices' Noted

LD0407175096 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1140 GMT 4 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 4 Jul (SRNA)—Borislav Pelevic, vice president of the Party of Serb Unity (SSJ), described the decision by Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, not to take part in the September elections as "a proof of his great willingness to make sacrifices."

Pelevic told SRNA that this "deeply correct and humane decision showed that Karadzic himself was in favor of the Dayton agreement and its implementation."

According to him, the SSJ "will not have candidates in the elections in the Serb Republic because it would be immoral to nominate anyone else but the person legally chosen to be its president."

Pelevic said he hoped that Karadzic would continue to be active politically as the leader of the Serb Democratic Party and that Serb candidates would work toward safeguarding the Serb Republic as a state.

"We are convinced that the presidential candidates will be consistent in pursuing the Serb national policy, working on preserving the Serb Republic as a state, and toward its unification with Serbia and Montenegro," Pelevic said.

Serbia: RS Socialists See Karadzic as 'Politically Dead'

AU0507105396 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 2 Jul 96 p 3

[Article by V. Djordjevic: "Little Karadzic Defends Himself"]

[FBIS Translated Text] No one here [in Banja Luka] knows the real truth regarding Karadzic's removal, because they serve us all kinds of different information in portions, Dragutin Ilic, chairman of the Socialist Party of the Serb Republic said to reporters of NASA BORBA. According to Ilic, as far as the socialists of the Serb Republic [RS] are concerned, Karadzic has been politically dead from the moment the Dayton Agreement was signed.

Today the little Karadzics are defending themselves. That is an entire establishment that has abused Serb national interests for their own ends. They know that they will lose in the upcoming elections and are doing everything they can to change that. That is why they need Karadzic, Ilic said. According to him, Karadzic is supported by intellectuals from Belgrade who sow hatred among nations but also by the international community.

We are a stubborn people, and the hullabaloo created around Karadzic by the international community can only strengthen his position, Ilic concluded.

Serbia: Karadzic Seen Leaving 'Backwards, Like a Crab'

AU0507105196 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 2 Jul 96 p 8

[Commentary by Veleimir Ilic: "Karadzic's Crab Strategy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Radovan Karadzic has submitted his resignation, withdrawn from public life, transferred his authority to Biljana Plavsic, will remain president until the September elections. In this jumble of information everything is both correct and incorrect, depending on the angle from which it is viewed and in what political context it is interpreted. A simple sum of facts, however, cannot give one single answer with one single meaning.

And the facts say—first, in spite of the intense pressure of the international community and Milosevic, Karadzic enjoys exceptional, at time even fanatical, support among the majority of the people, members of his

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

party, and his closest associates. And as far as that is concerned, given the ramified authority of the Serb Democratic Party [SDS] and the absolute control and loyalty of the media, even now, as they say in the Serb Republic, Karadzic could be its life-long president. Second, faced with the reality of not only possible the political, but also economic consequences, of sanctions which the world and Belgrade have throated to impose, the Pale government has been preparing for the last two months to lose the battle with the fewest casualties. It began by transferring part of the authority and Karadzic's withdrawal from public life, and continued with his reelection as head of the SDS and offer of conciliation to the international community. The latest move was a letter to Carl Bildt and the transfer of all authority to Biljana Plavsic, which practically means—resignation.

Following facts and logic, it would be possible to say with relative certainly that the president of the Serb Republic was leaving, but backwards, like a crab, being careful that his retreat from the political scene, that is, from his post as president, does not leave the throne on shaky legs, and that the state created in war is not left to the will of its so-called internal enemies, the mentors from Belgrade, and the international community. What is most important, bearing in mind the mentality of the people, that withdrawal must not appear to be a cowardly retreat, surrender, or the forsaking of national interests. This can be seen, more between the lines and less concretely, in Karadzic's last two public appearances in Pale.

This kind of political pragmatism displayed by the president of the Serb Republic is, no doubt, imposed, and with hardly a shadow of a doubt, we can already talk about Karadzic as the former president of the Serb Republic, because it is very improbable that he will use his charisma for a moral or even military mobilization of the people's will and traditional Serb stubbornness in order to defend his own presidential function. Going backwards like a crab, with a politically pathetic explanation about leaving for the good of the people of the Serb Republic, during the next few days we will probably first see his withdrawal as presidential candidate, wrapped in a decision of the SDS Main Committee, and later, perhaps, the relinquishing of his presidential post to one of his closest associates. The more so since in the political casino the stakes for Karadzic had been great from the very start, and the players with whom he got involved were gamblers with a lot more aces up their sleeves.

Serbia: Editorial Describes Karadzic 'Clutching at Straws'

AU0307180796 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 3 Jul 96 p 2

[Commentary by Boro Maric: "Walking Backwards"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The fate of elections in the Serb Republic will most probably be known on 4 July. On that day, the Serb Democratic Party [SDS] has to submit its election list of candidates and definitively reveal whether it is headed by chairman of the party Radovan Karadzic.

With such an attitude, Karadzic and the SDS are continuing, together with the international community, their tightrope-walking that started long ago, which may considerably jeopardize the outcome of the nearly four-year struggle of the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, in the Serb Republic.

The peace agreement bans Karadzic from holding any official, electoral, or any other public function, because he has been indicted by the International Tribunal for war crimes committed in former Yugoslavia.

This means that, even if formally, the president of the Serb Republic and chairman of the SDS cannot be a candidate in the September elections, which are a significant condition for international legitimization and even legalization of the Serb Republic.

By his coming and going from the political life, Karadzic has indeed linked the fate of the Serb Republic to his own and that of the SDS.

According to him, only a convincing, at least two-thirds victory for the SDS and Serb parties can lead toward the survival of the Serb Republic as a state. Any other result of the elections, he claims, will mean the integration of the Serb Republic into the Croatian-Muslim federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Defending his own political position and that of SDS, Karadzic says that "the world is not challenged by Radovan Karadzic, but rather by the SDS, that is, by the Serb people."

That this stance basically represents Karadzic clutching at straws, he himself confirms by saying the following at a meeting of the main committee of the SDS the day before yesterday: "All of them know that the people are determined to have their state."

If this is so and Karadzic was right on this point, why is he then making hazardous moves and linking his survival in political life to the attitude of the international community toward the Serb Republic and even toward the Serb people in general?

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Did not the Serb Republic, at least partly, come about as an expression of the will of that same international community? Or to put it the other way round: Would the Serb Republic exist at all if the international community did not want the Serbs in former Bosnia-Herzegovina to have their own state?

Because of Karadzic's possible candidacy in the September elections, the elections will probably be either canceled, or, if they do take place, the international community will not recognize them. In both cases the Serb Republic will be at loss, and while the prospect sanctions and a total international isolation is looming large.

Stuck in such a blind alley, the Serb Republic will not be too great a bother to the world, but instead of walking toward the future, it will be walking backwards.

Serbia: SPS's Gajevic: 'Less Political' Hague Tribunal

AU0307143996 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 1 Jul 96 pp 4-5

[Interview with Gorica Gajevic, general secretary of the Socialist Party of Serbia, by Milena Tanja; place and date not given: "Our Election Program Is Our Work Results"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted]

[Box, p 4]

The Time of Reason

[Tanjga] Everyone expects that the elections will do much to bring a stable peace to the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. How do you evaluate the situation in the Serb Republic?

[Gajevic] We are happy to see in the Serb Republic not only a strengthening of the Socialist Party, but a general movement that is opposed to the strongly nationalist policy, which does not take into account the interests of the people of the Serb Republic. After such a horrible thing as the war, the leading positions must not be held by extremist parties and they should not win. Reasonable parties are needed, which will be able to rebuild destroyed bridges and provide a stable peace and prosperity. In that respect, we not only help the Socialist Party, but we also help that entire front that is in favor of peace and prosperity.

[Box, p 5]

The Interest of the Powerful

[Tanjga] How do you view the latest measures of The Hague Tribunal?

[Gajevic] My own opinion, and I think that this is the view of the Socialist Party of Serbia, is that we should respect international institutions and international law, but we have seen that international law sometimes changes and adapts itself to the interests of the powerful. In this sense, The Hague Tribunal often makes hasty moves that are more inclined toward the political sphere than the purely judicial. We have never been in favor of supporting war criminals and we have confirmed this by signing all the charters and conventions, but we do expect that the work of that tribunal will be increasingly more professional and less political.

Serbia: Reshuffling of Government Viewed

96BA0346B Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 31 May 96 pp 10-11

[Article by Dragan Vujosevic: "Marjanovic's Ark"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Even before six new ministers in the Serbian government—Nedeljko Sipovac, minister of agriculture and deputy prime minister, Dusan Kanazir for science and technology, Milivoje Stamatovic for labor, veterans affairs, and social welfare, Svetolic Kostadinovic for transportation, Aleksandr Tijanic for information, Mirjana Stankovic for tourism, Srdjan Nikolic for trade (previously, minister of trade and tourism), and Ratomir Vico, minister without portfolio (previously, minister for information)—read the text of the oath of office, there was talk about a new reshuffling of Mirko Marjanovic's cabinet. The most long-lived Serbian government (26 months) since reestablishment of the multiparty system (the Zelenovic government lasted 10 months, the Bozovic 14 months, the Sainovic 14 months) is expected to undergo more changes in September, and a question mark is again hanging over Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic.

Merry-Go-Round

In any case, the story about this last change of the "blood picture" of the government began to travel faster when an unusually large number of delegates at the Congress of the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia] left the hall ("People wanted to smoke," Gorica Gajevic explained) when Marjanovic was about to speak. A bit later, toward the end of March, the prime minister said that changes in the government would take place in two weeks, but those two weeks became two months. The reasons it took so long are not to be found solely in the awkward conflict with former Governor Dragoslav Avramovic, but also in the conflicts between factions in the SPS and also in the tensions which still exist in relations between the Socialists and the JUL [Yugoslav Unified Left] in spite of all the oaths sworn to "brotherhood and unity" on the left.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

The guessing game about changes in the government has clearly been "following" these lines of the conflict. It has been said that the "hard-line Socialists," divided into two groups: "Vucelic's pals" Radovan Pankov, Jovan Radic, and Aleksa Jokic and the "independents" Ratko Markovic and Slobodan Babic—will certainly be leaving it. To get rid of Pankov, thought was even given to doing away with his ministry for Serbs outside Serbia. It is remembered against Jokic that he defended Vucelic in the government when the decision to remove him had already been made "in the proper quarters." Radic barely survived the party purge, when substantial figures like Mihailo Markovic and Bora Jovic, who was still a minister, but lost his post as first among the Socialists of Novi Sad, left the SPS in November. Nevertheless, Radic's "followers" raised their heads, and in a meeting of the Assembly did not vote for his dismissal, which utterly confused President Dragan Tomic. This lack of voting discipline and also the heated exchange between Mihalj Kertes and Mirko Kulic the day before in the Assembly show that "the process of ventilation of the SPS is not over yet." Ratko Markovic, who "had too many moments in which he was mischievous" and himself has been announcing his departure, came to the aid of the beleaguered Tomic in a situation in the Assembly that was by no means pleasant. Babic is the only one on the list of the "hard-liners" whose "name was put on the personnel merry-go-round" by persons unknown.

At the same time, two stories were also started about the "to be or not to be" of the JUL ministers in the government. Sources of information close to the left have said that they have a guarantee that people leaning in their direction are remaining, that is, their members Dragan Kostic and Andrija Milosavljevic, their sympathizers Leposava Milicevic and Arandjel Markicevic, as well as the more distant "friends" Dragan Tomic ("Simpo") and Mirko Marjanovic, while Ivko Djonovic and Slobodan Radulovic (New Democracy) are guaranteed "to be flying." It is interesting that these sources did not say who on the left would be coming into the government, unless we count the announced appointment of Dusan Mitevic, a close friend of Mira Markovic, to the post of deputy prime minister.

Djonovic

Complete uncertainty has also prevailed concerning the four members of the government from New Democracy, especially after the utterly undiplomatic statement of Svetozar Krstic, deputy prime minister: "I do not know what the Socialists would do without New Democracy."

When Mirko Marjanovic looked at his cards and read the names of those whose services he had lost "because of fatigue, health, or departure for a new post," only two dismissals were odd: Ivko Djonovic and Vekoslav Sosovic.

"Djonovic should not have been removed, because they paid more attention to Cvele (Vladimir Cvetkovic, minister of athletics), but it should have been Mirko and you," Djonovic's critic, the oppositionist Zaharije Trnavcevic, told deputy prime minister Radulovic in the corridor of the Serbian Assembly.

There are three theories about Djonovic's departure making the rounds: that he himself asked for it, that he was the victim of a showdown in the SPS, and that he is being prepared for a ministerial post in the federal government (whose "spectacular reconstruction" is being announced).

One person familiar with the cosmetic "developments" says of Sosovic's departure: "Marjanovic told him on Saturday morning that there was no longer a need to have a minister for Kosovo and Metohija in the government. Just imagine, now not a single manager of an enterprise or director of an institution in Kosmet has a direct contact with the government."

A Game in Which Nothing Was Left to Chance

But all that is the past. The present is that Serbia now has a refurbished government and the opposition omitted to say in the Assembly what it thinks about both the old and new ministers. "This is an insignificant topic. We did not want to take Milosevic's bait and debate unimportant ministers. He has been continually reshuffling the governments, and everything has remained the same, this has been a game in which nothing was left to chance," one oppositionist said.

According to that theory, Milosevic uses the reshufflings of the government to keep in constant fear not only its present, but also potential members, and then for continual purging of the "scoundrels from his own ranks" in order to show the people that the "head of state" punishes the bad executors of his good intentions, that is, those who have been spoiling the happiness and contentment of the entire people, which is a revival of the well-known stereotype: "Ah, if Tito only knew what these people of his were doing...there would be hell to pay."

Nor did the assurance that the JUL had won yet another battle with the SPS represent anything new in interpretations of the change of ministers. The disagreements begin when the demand is advanced for new ministers to be appointed who are more inclined to the JUL.

Sipovac is an old "hard-liner" of the SPS "who has calmed down somewhat; for that matter, Marjanovic

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

himself is no longer what he was two months ago, and he got the job so that the entire team which carried out the antibureaucratic revolution in Vojvodina would not disappear from the scene," says a man familiar with the life of the SPS. He thinks that Stamatovic, director of the Clinical Center in Belgrade, can also be seen as an SPS-ite with no inclination toward the JUL; according to stories in the SPS, his post is supposed to be taken by Slavica Djukic-Dejanovic, vice president of the incumbent party.

NIN's sources agree that Svetolik Kostadinovic, the new transportation minister, is exceptionally inclined toward the JUL. But dilemmas begin immediately with Mirjana Stankovic, the woman who heads the Transportation Ministry. Some say that she came into the government as a representative of Nebojsa Maljkovic, who is on the JUL Top Ten, others that she has actually replaced Maljkovic at Putnik, yet others that she is a professional and a realist who will show the necessary amount of "ideological color blindness" only in order to do the job "the way it should be done."

Tijanic

No party membership is entered beside the names of Academician Kanazir and "the minor and impoverished journalist" Tijanic, but one of NIN's informants attributes to them "the logistic support of the Karic brothers, which is very important because Bogoljub will have in his hands two extremely important and sensitive sectors: information and scientific-technical cooperation with the world."

However, the tag immediately put on Tijanic is his "good understanding with Mira Markovic" who is the reason the "giant of Yugoslav journalism" never dipped his sharp pen in poison ink and who is said to have had the key role is attributed in his advancement to minister.

Tijanic's work duties lump together both "changing Serbia's image in the world" and "running the election campaign of the SPS and JUL," and his reward for one year of hard labor as a minister (with several thousand dinars/marks on top of the ministerial 1,500-2,000 dinars) is said to be the post of director of a Balkan media company in Makedonska Street.

One of NIN's informants, who knows both Tijanic and the way the government operates, says that his position will be much stronger than it appears at first because he will attend all the interministerial coordinating sessions at which decisions are made on key issues and which include the prime minister and deputy prime ministers, but only those ministers who are invited.

Mitevic Prime Minister?

That will be a good channel for influence of the Karic Company, which was attempting in this reshuffling to "insert" Dusan Mitevic in the position of deputy prime minister, NIN was told by its informant, who says that in one conversation Bogoljub Karic said that Dusan Mitevic would be an ideal prime minister.

Does Tijanic's arrival in the government, then, signify the opening of a channel for a stronger "Karic infiltration into the institutions of the system, perhaps even bringing Karic to the post of prime minister?" Someone in the Karic Company answered this question by saying: "Forget it. That would mean that the SPS was giving up power."

Nevertheless, it seems that we are quite close to the time in which the "managerial elite" of Serbia will have as its only ideology the slogan that it is "in favor of a normal life worthy of a human being," and of which one will join on the basis of past service, capital, and inclination. Power will be wielded, then, by a "dedicated elite," and in that case it makes absolutely no difference whether you belong to the SPS, the JUL, New Democracy, the Karic Company.... Happiness in that family can be spoiled only by the "frustration of those power figures, above all in the JUL, for whom money is not enough, but they also need a strong political position. Imagine the feelings of an artist at the political game like Zoran Todorovic when he looks at these *naturshchiki* [Russian: person pretending to be an artist or sculptor] from the (quasi-)leadership of the SPS. Well, it must drive him nuts!"

Perhaps this reshuffled government of Serbia also indicates the future election coalition, especially because the separate talks of Dusan Mihajlovic, chief of New Democracy, with Slobodan Milosevic and Mira Markovic have obviously been brought to a successful conclusion.

"If I knew whether that would be a new coalition, I would know more than a man can know," says one of NIN's informants, who believes that the decision on that will be made "in the proper quarter" in the middle or late summer. Another of NIN's sources says that the SPS and JUL, in spite of this "historic conversation" last Wednesday, still have not worked out the fine points of a coalition. Part of the JUL favors an independent appearance in the election, and the other, aware of its own election potential, favors a coalition with a slate led by Milosevic, and a third group favors a coalition with outstanding names of both the JUL and SPS.

When there are so many options, then it is possible for someone else to be included as well—New Democracy,

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

the Karic brothers.... The new government looks like a test model of a possible new coalition.

Serbia: Media Handling of Djindjic Case Protested

AU0307195596 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1243 GMT 3 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 3 Jul (BETA)—The office of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia has protested today the "misuse of the political trial against Zoran Djindjic, the leader of the Democratic Party, by the state television."

In its statement, the Helsinki Committee says last night's commentary during the second television newscast showed that "the current regime does not shrink from exerting direct pressure on the court while the trial is under way."

It added that after the commentary, viewers of the official television station were left without the slightest doubt about Zoran Djindjic's guilt and that the only possibility left to the court was to confirm the verdict given by the television.

In its statement, the Helsinki Committee says the television station has "in a manner typical of the program, severely violated the freedom of information enshrined in the Constitution by commenting on the defense and statements made by Djindjic during the hearing."

The Helsinki Committee adds that the television station "has probably never heard of the right to defense in a lawsuit," of which the defendant's right to be heard is the most important part. Those rights include the freedom to make televised statements, the committee adds.

However, "even if the state television has never heard of the defense's advantage, a set of principles that are supposed to create a certain advantage for the defendant over the state prosecutor, it still should have never publicized such misinformation this way, thereby severely offending the FRY Constitution," the statement of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia concludes.

Montenegro

Montenegro: Djindjic: Republic Opposes 'Dictator' Milosevic

AU0407154996 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1036 GMT 4 Jul 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica, 4 Jul (BETA)—Democratic Party [DS] chairman Zoran Djindjic has said today that he "understands completely the natural aspirations in Montenegro not to have a dictator such as Milosevic holding forth over them," MONTENA-FAX reports.

Speaking about the possibility of the Montenegro state gaining more independence, Djindjic told Podgorica Antena M radio that he thought that the Serbian authorities should have far more benevolent understanding for Montenegro since "it is natural that, if Serbia is 16 times larger than Montenegro, it should have 16 times more understanding for it."

"Everyone wants to secede from Milosevic. We cannot secede from him but we can secede him from us. I in Serbia find it hard to bear, let alone someone who does not have to," Djindjic said.

As the interviewer insisted on Djindjic clarifying his views on the possibility of Montenegro becoming an independent sovereign state, Djindjic warned that this would be much more difficult.

He said that, considering everything that the people would have to deal with emotionally and institutionally for Montenegro to become a separate state, "too much would suffer and cause a great deal of frustration to the people, who would take it with great difficulty."

The DS leader said that it was much simpler to create a better federal state with a much more relaxed attitude toward the autonomy of various federal units, in which everyone could do what he thinks is in their interest.

"Montenegro cannot jeopardize Serbia with any independent action, since Montenegro is so small in population and natural resources that even a bad decision by the Montenegrin authorities could not damage Serbia," he told the radio.

Vojvodina

Vojvodina: Editorial Criticizes Federal Government

96BA0320C Novi Sad MAGYAR SZO in Hungarian 13 Apr 96 p 1

[Editorial by Marta Varju: "The Federation Is Sound Asleep"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Actually, what is the Federation doing? Is it hibernating? For years it has been said that such a thing does not exist anywhere in the world: the parliaments of the various republics enact one piece of legislation after another, while it is fortunate if the federal parliament is only able to follow suit by taking sluggish steps. But nowadays we find that the federal legislature does not even try to keep in step with its "little brothers," it simply manifests a passive attitude instead. Many people have taken note of this and have

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

raised this issue previously, but to no avail. Today we hear comments critical of the federal government and the parliament virtually on a daily basis. This was especially the case after the unsuccessful journey of banking governor Dragoslav Avramovic to Paris, when it became clearer than the light of day that the federal officials who accompanied him had played a different tune than the creator of the second program. The absence of streamlined steps and agreements was obvious.

The same characterizes the reconciliation of issues between the federal and the republican legislatures. Last year's legislative backlog awaiting action by the federal parliament is so great that they could not dispose of all legislative proposals even if they worked day and night on each and every work day. But this is not what they are doing. Instead, Radoman Bozovic, the chairman of the Council of Citizens, is developing privatization plans, and is taking trips to various socialist countries—such as Moldavia, China and Korea—and stays there for weeks presumably to gather interesting experiences. Meanwhile the federal government keeps secret how it perceives the exchange of social assets and property, what kind of law it is preparing, and how that law would be applied let us say in Crna Gora, where most of this process has already been completed. We can only make guesses regarding privatization, as well as laws applicable to enterprises and entrepreneurs, even though these laws should be implemented on a very urgent basis.

Behind this great passivity of the federal parliament there appears to be a trend by which the federal parliament prefers to wait until the Serb parliament adopts a law, and only after that does the federal parliament place a given law on the legislative calendar for approval by both houses of the federal legislature. The federal parliament usually prepares a copy of the legal provisions enacted at the level of the [Serb] Republic, and thereby operates a certain delayed approval process. But this is the preferable situation, because when the federal parliament grants a delayed approval, it at least does something to enable the legal system to function, so that life does not come to a standstill. In some instances, however, the federal parliament remains silent regarding certain laws, or delays debate over such laws, and this produces increasingly grave consequences. In certain fields of life there are no legal provisions to be applied, or if there are some, practice must conform with old, obsolete legal provisions, because new, amended alternatives have not been presented to the House, moreover, most often the sponsor of a law, the federal government, has not even begun to consider placing a given law on the legislative calendar.

Objections to the workings of the federal government and the federal parliament mount, but it seems that all this is to no avail, because the federation is sound asleep and it does not want to regain consciousness; With the passing of time we hear not only that the federal government has become an institution of the Crna Gora and Serbian Socialist parties, it is also referred to as a puppet of those two socialist parties.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

BULK RATE
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
PERMIT NO. 168
HERNDON, VA.

This is a U.S. Government publication produced by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

FBIS collects, translates, disseminates, and analyzes foreign open-source information on behalf of the U.S. Government. Its publications may contain copyrighted material. *Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.*

— Bracketed indicators before the first sentence of each item describe the way in which the material was processed by FBIS.

— Headlines and all bracketed explanatory notes are supplied by FBIS.

— Personal and place names are rendered in accordance with the decisions of the U.S. Board on Geographic Names as adapted by FBIS. Unverified names in radio and television material appear in parentheses and are spelled phonetically; words and phrases in parentheses preceded by a question mark are unclear in the original and deduced from context.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

U.S. Government Customers

For a list of FBIS products, to subscribe to an FBIS publication, or to indicate a change of address contact:

FBIS
P.O. Box 2604
Washington, DC 20013-2604
Telephone: (202) 338-6735
FAX: (703) 733-8042

Non-Government Customers

Subscriptions are available from the National Technical Information Service:

NTIS
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, VA 22161
Telephone: (703) 487-4630
FAX: (703) 321-8547

New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.